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DISPOSITIONS AS EDUCATIONAL AIMS

by



GEORGE L.C. HILLS

A THESIS

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and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for
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of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.*

ABSTRACT

This is a study of an important element in education as viewed by nine famous educational thinkers, ancient and modern. It is shown that each of these thinkers have emphasized in their conceptions of the aims of education a dispositional or attitudinal factor besides such other elements as knowledge and understanding. While pointing out that the thinkers considered in this study have different outlooks on meta-physical, epistemological, political and other matters, it is also shown that there is agreement on the question of fostering appropriate intellectual and moral dispositions in education.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In this thesis I intend to study the thought of a number of historically influential and distinguished philosophers and writers on the subject of education. My particular purpose is to analyze the statements of educational aims made by these thinkers to show that these stated aims include some "dispositional" elements or factors, in addition to knowledge and understanding, as the desirable outcomes of education. An examination of the aims, goals, or objectives of education entails the explication of the particular concept of education developed by each of these thinkers. From the point of view of this study, the emphasis falls primarily upon the "achievement aspect" of education, as opposed to, say, the activities of teaching and learning. In this manner, the focus is upon those qualities of mind, both intellectual and moral, which these philosophers regard as the desirable characteristics attributable to an "educated man".

To the extent that dispositions are neither innate nor the result of fortune, we may view their inculcation as an important aspect of education. However, the present study is analytic in character; and therefore the question "How such dispositions are to be fostered?", which is an empirical matter, will not be directly considered. My concern is with examining the views of philosophers of education, from Plato

to Peters, and demonstrating why and in what way the fostering of dispositions is a very significant feature of their pedagogical thought. The empirical questions which may be raised in this connection should properly be answered, if indeed they are answerable, by the social sciences, including psychology, sociology and so on.

In this context I shall be using the term 'disposition' or dispositional property in a very broad sense to include a wide variety of abilities, attitudes and traits of character and personality. The qualities of mind may be intellectual, emotional or moral or a combination of these. We may speak of attitudes such as bigotry or tolerance as being descriptive of some elements of an individual's personality. To say that Mr. X is tolerant, is to say that if certain conditions arise he tends to display behaviour which is sympathetic or indulgent of practices and views different than his own. To meet these conditions we would want to say that such a person was awake, conscious and not under the influence of drugs and so on. In this way we may say that these mental or psychological elements are present without being committed to the further assertion that they are more or less constantly on display. A man might well be said to be very reasonable, yet this may not be the case if someone is suddenly waking him up or if he happens to be drugged.

The importance of acquiring certain dispositions is, as Frankena has stated, "I must have the capacity, as it were, to store one thing away while I do something else, and control its return when I want it

again."¹ This enables one to display certain qualities on some occasions and not others, thereby facilitating one's participation in worthwhile activities with appropriate thought and conduct. Of course, there are many dispositions such as bigotry, cruelty and being homicidal which we would regard as undesirable and, by the same token, we would not consider them as being aims of education. In using 'education' then, I mean that it is an intentional activity which aims at fostering certain desirable attitudes and states of mind. It may be the case that a man has a B.Ed. and also a highly developed taste for cruelty, but my notion of education does not commit me to any claim about his being educated. There is an almost endless list of terms which we employ to characterize the conduct and personality of individuals. However, only those which may be regarded as desirable can properly be considered as aims of education.

The philosophers studied here belong to a variety of differing metaphysical, epistemological, ethical and political schools. Despite the divergent character of many of these positions there still exists a fundamental agreement on the point that dispositions are important objectives to be pursued and realized in education.

Plato's metaphysics is based upon a distinction between the 'world

¹Frankena, William K., Three Historical Philosophies of Education (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965), p. 3.

of sense-experience' and the 'world of Ideas'. Aristotle, in a somewhat similar fashion, draws a sharp distinction between 'matter' and 'form' making the latter more important than 'matter'. However, these metaphysical views are not shared by a number of other philosophers, namely Locke, Dewey and Russell whom I shall be considering in this essay.

In the sphere of epistemology too, the philosophers under consideration hold diverse views as to the origin, nature, and validity of human knowledge. For example, while Plato assumes that certain knowledge in a final and fixed form is possible and indeed desirable, Dewey and Russell would claim that human knowledge is at best hypothetical in nature. Besides the old dispute between rationalism and some forms of empiricism there are other areas in logic and epistemology, namely inference and meaning, in which these philosophers are seen to disagree.

Another important area of considerable disagreement is ethics. Here again, Plato and Dewey seem to represent the two extremes. Since ethical theories have close bearings on the problems of education, these philosophers tend to consider the aim and purpose of education rather differently.

From a political point of view, the philosophers I shall be considering do represent almost every shade of political theory. The principles of the Ideal Republic differ fundamentally from Locke's

political theory and from Dewey's principles of democracy. Rousseau's political thinking on the other hand can be seen as equally relevant to the understanding of modern totalitarian states as well as the contemporary democratic ideology.

In spite of the differences in their basic philosophical doctrines or in their approach to problems relevant to education, these men, all of them, believe that education involves the fostering of certain fundamental intellectual and moral dispositions which are seen to be worthwhile. They do disagree among themselves with regard to those dispositions which are worthwhile. Plato, for instance, is unlikely to consider the qualities of mind advocated by Russell as the most desirable ones for the preservation of the Ideal State. On the otherhand, there is a very close parallel between Aristotle's "theoretical wisdom" and Arnold's conception of a "scientific passion". Even though there is some agreement on the attitudes to be inculcated there is difference about their value or importance in each theory of education.

In examining the concept of education articulated by various philosophers of education it can be shown that for each of them knowledge is essential for education. Thus, in addition to agreement on the proposition that 'the development of certain mental dispositions is an important outcome of education', there exists an agreement on the significance of knowledge. Many would also agree with Peters' notion of an educated man that he is transformed by what he knows, which Peters refers to as the "attitudinal aspect of knowledge". It then seems that

knowing is very closely connected with the various attitudes and appreciations which characterize the outlook of the educated man, as conceived by most of these philosophers. However, to say that knowing is closely related to these other psychological factors and traits of character is not to characterize the nature of the relationship. It is not my intention to pursue the matter here but simply to point out that the connection of knowledge and disposition is a highly complex matter, and as yet we know very little about the effect of 'knowing' on the personality of the knower. However, in this discussion we will assume with our philosophers that knowledge is related to or has effect on dispositions without trying to subject this assumption to critical examination. Such an examination requires, besides conceptual clarification, a considerable amount of empirical investigation which is beyond the scope of the present study.

CHAPTER II

PLATO

Plato discusses education and its aims and purposes in the context of the Ideal State. His concern with the conception of an Ideal State leads him to consider how and in what ways it may be perpetuated. Education is the chief instrument by and through which this goal may be achieved. Consequently, his educational thought is developed in the context of his political and social theory.

According to Plato, the politico-social order is composed of individuals who are, in effect, miniatures of society. That is to say, each person has a soul constituted by three elements, comparable to the three classes in the Ideal social order. In the education of the individual the purpose is to make him a co-operative member of the Ideal State. Therefore, Plato holds that certain intellectual and moral dispositions must be fostered in order that the individual may be fitted into the politico-social scheme of things. Plato also tries to show that his social and educational recommendations are consistently based on his more general philosophical doctrines.

The Republic has been selected due to its systematic character, and because here more than anywhere else, Plato is directly concerned with the problems of education. The aims and purposes of education are discussed in relation to the philosophical theories and the goals of the

Ideal State. In this way, it seems, it is possible to examine Plato's educational theory in the broader contexts of his thought.

The Republic represents an attempt to conceive and articulate the conditions and consequences related to the creation and preservation of the Ideal State. The institutions in the Ideal Republic are designed to serve this end. Education can be seen as an institutional set-up whose primary purpose is to ensure that the Ideal State will be perpetuated from one generation to the next. Consequently, Plato's recommendations, as to the methods, contents and aims of education must be seen in the wider context of social goals and purposes.

To perpetuate the Ideal State, Plato deems it necessary to establish a scheme of education which will create ideal or just individuals who will rule, and citizens who will participate in the maintenance of this socio-political order. To contribute toward the preservation of the state, the individual must be "one man and not many". The ideal man is seen as composed of three distinct but related elements. The soul of each individual can perform three different functions which, if harmoniously integrated, can contribute to the well-being of the person. Each element has a proper role, and the exercise of that function is termed its 'virtue'. Reason, the rational component in the soul, is responsible for controlling the individual's behaviour. Its function is legislative, reflecting on alternatives and making decisions concerning conduct. This tendency, to reflect or reason when fully exercised by the

person, is termed "wisdom". The "spirited element" in the soul is the spring board of all expressions of aggression, anger and indignation. The manifestations of spirit are regulated, in the ideal person, by the restraints of reason. A man who displays this inclination or disposition can, in Plato's view, be said to have "courage". Hunger, thirst and sexual desire are attributable to the "appetitive" element in the soul. To submit appetite, to the guidance of the reason and spirit, requires that the Ideal man be "temperate". The harmony and concord present in the soul of a man whose reason, spirit, and appetite discharge their proper duties, represents the trait of "justice". Unity or justice in the soul does not come to pass by happenstance, indeed it is the end of a very rigorous and intensive education lasting for many years.

The Ideal State, like the ideal person, must become an organic whole. Unity in society, Plato thinks, is a consequence of each individual pursuing the role for which his nature and his education have equipped him. Similarly, the society like the person, is composed of three elements; the ruling class, the warrior class and the artisans. A harmonious state is the result of each class doing its proper work without interfering with the others. In order that justice prevail, the rulers must display wisdom, the warriors - courage, and the artisans - temperance. All of these qualities are to be fostered by education beginning with elementary training from birth to age fifteen, or eighteen for the brighter students.

Plato's scheme of elementary education is divided into two branches: one directed toward cultivating the philosophic element in the soul; the other consisting in the training of the spirited element.¹ Cultivation of the mind is thought to be the result of a curriculum of literature, dramatic recitation and music. The term 'physical training' is not employed in the ordinary sense of an activity for developing muscular skills and prowess at a number of sporting activities. It is a process primarily designed to discipline the spirited element of the soul.

Literature is the first subject of study, since young children are usually told stories by their mothers or nurses. Extreme care and attention must be exercised in selecting tales to be related because the child's character is most malleable at this stage, and undesirable literature may well have a bad effect. Hence, Plato advocates strict censorship of all literary materials that are to be placed before the youth. Accounts of heroes, gods and of the lives of others must contain no description or allusions to "questionable" activities; the first stories a child hears "shall be designed to produce the best possible effects on his character".² Training of character is thus the foremost concern in the selection of prose and poetry, this being the aim of the literary aspect of elementary education. It is not a matter of being

¹Plato, The Republic, F.M. Cornford (trans.), (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 68, 100 - 102.

²Ibid., p. 70.

able to match titles and authors on an examination, or knowing that the chief characters in the selection were Dick, Jane, and Fido. Indeed, the study of literature aims at developing the soul, and thereby, the total personality of the student.

Whereas literature involves the examination of the content of prose and poetry, dramatic recitation is concerned with its form (i.e., Narrative, dramatic or a combination of the two). In Plato's view, these arts have a very strong influence on character,

"The reproduction of another person's gestures or tones of voice or states of mind, if persisted from youth up, grows into a habit which becomes second nature."³

Acting and reciting are activities which involve the mind of the participant; the actor assumes the character of the person he is playing, the narrator develops an appreciation of the verses he is uttering. This training is not to be confused with the contemporary practice of memorizing a role or with spouting stanzas learned by rote. Education, in the dramatic arts, aims at having the child identify with that character, not for a single performance but for life. In the same manner, the narrator becomes the author by delivering his works. Since imitation has such a significant effect on the character of the child, the manifest importance of censorship is again clear.

Music, too, must be cleansed of any harmful elements before it is

³Ibid., p. 83.

presented to the student. Melody should embody only those tones and accents properly expressive of a man of good character. Bravery, steadfastness and wise restraint (temperance) are the qualities to be contained in and manifested by melody. Rhythm is also important, as the child's life must, in some sense, reflect the rhythm of the music he studies in childhood. Plato thinks that harmony and rhythm "sink deep into the recesses of the soul"⁴ and foster a certain grace of body and mind. The aim, or purpose, of education, in music is clearly not the attainment of skill on some instrument or mastering the words of a large number of lyrical compositions. Rather musical training seeks to immerse the mind in harmony and rhythm in order that they may penetrate the deepest corners of the soul and bring about a profound change in both personality and conduct.

Physical training seeks to give to the body a similar form and grace that music is designed to foster in the soul. It does not involve developing athletes, nor does it mean that this activity is to be a 'free-for-all'. It must be simple and flexible, while aiming at fitness and at stimulating the spirit of the student.⁵ Physical training is preparatory to military training for those who are selected to proceed beyond the elementary stage.

⁴Ibid., p. 90.

⁵Ibid., pp. 93 - 94, 100 - 102.

This stage of education, for Plato, does not consist in pouring literature and music into an empty storage vault, nor does it entail building muscles of immense proportions. He says,

excellence in the form and content of discourse and of musical expression and rhythm, and grace of form and movement, all depend on goodness of nature, by which I mean, not the foolish simplicity called by courtesy 'good nature', but a nature in which goodness of character has been well and truly established.⁶

Establishing the roots of good character is the ultimate purpose of the elementary curriculum. Cultivation of the mind and physical training, respectively, seek to bring the philosophic and the spirited elements of the soul into harmony with each other. Presumably, since the majority of the citizenry of the Ideal State will not pass beyond this level of education, the most important disposition or character-trait to be cultivated is temperance.⁷ This mental quality has what may be described as a personal and a civic exercise. The temperate person is one who displays restraint in regard to the appetite for food, drink and sexual gratification. At the same time, in the Republic, the man of temperance displays a willingness to obey the laws set down by the philosopher-king. Those who have had this elementary instruction should also possess an appreciation for music, literature and form and

⁶ Ibid., p. 89.

⁷ Ibid., p. 78.

grace of movement. Elementary education, therefore, has as its principal aims, the fostering of aesthetic appreciations and ethical traits of character.

Military training is given to those students who have been selected on the basis of their eagerness to learn, goodness of character, sound memory and dogged appetite for hard work. These mental qualities, which are aims of education, are thus employed as criteria for evaluating and deciding upon those students who will move to the next phase of training. Practical training for the conduct of war is the core of this portion of the curriculum. From the ages of eighteen to twenty, students participate in manoeuvres, games, hunting and other sporting activities, designed to make them adaptable to varieties of climate and diet. The aim of this training is the tempering of the spirit and bringing it under the control and guidance of reason. This propensity, or disposition, is termed 'courage'.⁸ Courage, as a trait of character similar to 'temperance', has two kinds of exercise; personal and civic, the occurrence of the personal trait making the display of the civic trait possible. The man of courage is one who, following the dictates of reason, is aware of those things which should and should not be feared, both in his private life and in his role as a citizen. Plato is particularly concerned that military training should be a test of character,

⁸Ibid., pp. 100 - 101, 122 - 123, 140.

rather than simply going through routines and manoeuvres for the sake of practice.

Presumably, those students displaying the best character will be given the privilege of undertaking "detached studies" in mathematics. Up to this point, the program of studies has concentrated upon objects accessible to the senses only: physical and military training, instruction in literature and music, being concerned with changing bodily strength and the ebb and flow of harmony in character, respectively. Such training could have only fostered good habits based on right belief, because the senses, according to Plato, can never be a source of knowledge.⁹ Knowledge is a state of mind resulting from the reason's apprehension of the "Form of the Good". The "Form of the Good" is visible only to those souls which have been trained in Dialectic, and consequently all who fail to reach this level of education operate on "belief", as opposed to "knowledge", in the Platonic sense. Belief may be true or false and in this respect students who are exposed to anything less than the highest object of knowledge are merely being indoctrinated. That is to say, they do not earn "the right to the assurance of the truth of their information."¹⁰

The mathematical curriculum includes: arithmetic, geometry, solid

⁹ Ibid., p. 237.

¹⁰ Israel Scheffler, "Philosophical Models of Teaching" in I. Scheffler (ed.), Philosophy and Education, 2nd. edition, Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1966), p. 106.

geometry, astronomy and harmonics. Plato's rationale for selecting these topics is based upon the conviction that they are concerned with principles and properties of certain objects in the material world. Each study deals with a distinct (so Plato thinks) class of objects, i.e., numbers, figures, solid bodies and so on. Commencing with particular objects perceivable by the senses, each science derives common properties or "essences" attributable to one class of objects. Principles or common properties are not accessible to the senses, but must be apprehended by reason or "thinking" and consequently, Plato regards them as "objects of thought". Mathematics is therefore a study which begins with the senses but which is ultimately directed "upward" toward reason.

The aim of this aspect of education is to "draw the soul away from the world of change to reality",¹¹ that is, to awaken the mind and to foster its power to think. Converting or "turning the soul away" from the material world implies a very profound and far-reaching change in the mind of the student. The individual who has completed this part of the curriculum will be a 'different person' than he was when he began. His disposition or propensity to think, having been cultivated, enables him to transcend the here and now, and to proceed to ideas which are eternal and unchanging. He will be able to apprehend universals in

¹¹Plato, The Republic, F.M. Cornford (ed.), p. 237.

this process rather than mere particulars. Beginning with the assumptions in any of these sciences he is able to draw conclusions by reasoning deductively. "Thinking", the state of mind which is the coping-stone of this branch of education, must be seen as a comparatively sophisticated achievement. This is particularly so when viewed in relation to the contemporary scheme of things.

Present concern in the teaching of mathematics or science seems to be with problem-solving techniques and the storing-up of facts. Ream upon ream of problem sheets with fill-in-the-blank notes trap the minds of students in the world of the senses. The current purpose would appear to be far from developing thought; instead of concern for the principles of science and mathematics the tendency seems to flood the memory with facts, figures and formulae. The disposition to think can only result from an awareness of the particular framework of each discipline. Memory may be depleted by time or by forgetting, but a quality of mind, once it has been well and truly established remains long after Mathematics A and Physics B.

Plato thinks that there are further concomitants to be acquired from the pursuit of these studies. They encourage the mind to think more rapidly and facilitate the individual's learning more quickly by preparing the mind for all other forms of study. Astronomy and harmonics generate an appreciation of beauty and goodness by their attention to the heavenly bodies and the consonance of the musical scale. On the whole,

mathematical education in The Republic aims at altering the personality of the student by fostering traits of character, attitudes and appreciations by changing the focus of perspective of the soul. It is possible to question the validity of Plato's conceptions of the various physical sciences, and indeed his manner of proceeding, but there can be little doubt about the importance or significance of the aims which he advocates.

The final stage, in formal education, is open only to those who demonstrate qualities necessary to become philosopher-kings. Mathematical training has paved the way for Dialectic, which is logical reasoning applied to the study of both natural and moral sciences. "Philosophic discussion", says Plato, treats the premises of these sciences, not as assumptions, but as hypotheses, "things laid down like a flight of steps", by which reason, unaided by the senses, ascends to an unconditional first principle of all science.¹² This principle, which Plato terms "the Good", is the highest object of knowledge, i.e., the well-spring of all truth and value. Knowledge of the Good is a cosmic perspective of the moral and physical order in the universe, that enables those who have such understanding, to gain a comprehensive view of the relationships which unite all science. This state of mind, therefore, is the ultimate aim of Plato's scheme of education. It is

¹²Ibid., p. 226.

the purpose which encompasses all others.

The process of education in Dialectic involves turning the soul away from the material world of change and directing it to the changeless world of forms and the supreme majesty of the "Form of the Good". Only when this profound change has occurred can the person properly be said to have knowledge. Once this state of mind has been reached, it can never be lost or forgotten. Plato recognizes that many people mistakenly believe that education consists in putting knowledge into a soul which does not already possess it. To educate, in the Platonic framework, is to convert the soul and enable it to gain truth and value, by an inward perception of reality. The power is in the soul from birth, but it remains dormant without appropriate nurture. Education does not entail making the student a veritable almanac containing all manner and variety of facts, nor does it include making the individual a master of social charm and grace. According to Plato, "knowledge is virtue", and those who know the good will be disposed to do good things. This is "wisdom", which enables the philosopher-ruler to conduct the affairs of state and his private life - justly. Wisdom is not possible without knowledge, but it does imply a transformation of the whole personality and thus outstrips knowledge. The Platonic metaphor "turning around of the eye of the soul" suggests that the emphasis is on the inner qualities of the personality, a state of being, so to say, than on mere knowing. To call a person 'wise' in the Platonic sense is thus to describe his whole

character, not just what he knows but also the kind of person he is.

CHAPTER III

ARISTOTLE

For Aristotle, like Plato, education is an important element cast within the framework of his social and political theory. In The Politics, education is conceived as a process by which citizens are prepared to pursue the chief goal of the state - the life of cultivated leisure. Happiness, which results from such an existence, can be derived in two ways: first, through intellectually excellent thought; and, second, by morally excellent actions. Each activity is worthwhile in itself and requires no extrinsic motivation to encourage those who would engage in such undertakings.

Aristotle thinks that for one to become involved in the life of cultivated leisure one must be made ready, that is to say, one must be educated. In The Ethics, he discusses the dispositions that must be fostered by education, if the person is to lead the good life. These intellectual and moral qualities of mind are thus related to, and discussed in, the contexts of political and social theory as well as in regard to ethics and Aristotle's theory of knowledge.

Theoretical wisdom, which is composed of intuitive reason and scientific knowledge, is related to epistemology. As one of the primary outcomes of Aristotelean education, it entails knowing and understanding principles coupled with the ability to draw conclusions from such

principles. This is necessary for engaging in the quest for truth for its own sake, via intellectually excellent thought.

According to Aristotle, truth is sought for yet another reason: as a basis for good and noble actions. The notion of "practical wisdom" is also related to Aristotle's ethical views as well as his economic and political theory. Practical wisdom requires knowledge and understanding of certain principles of the human good. However, claims about what is good for mankind in general are somewhat difficult to interpret. Giving precise content to this notion, in order that it may function as a rationale for conduct, is to some extent problematic and would seem to depend on factors such as cultural and social context. At any rate, Aristotle's conception of education is closely tied to many other processes and institutions in the social and political order. Any examination of his views about education necessitates a study of them.

Aristotle conceives of education as a process integrally related to all other activities in the life of the state. In The Politics he develops a conception of the best state, as an association of persons individually and collectively seeking the good life. The good life is the ultimate aim of politics and, by implication, of education. Happiness, which is identical with, and the result of, living a life of cultivated leisure, is something "such that it is sought for its own sake while other things are sought for the sake of it", and "such that,

if it were attained nothing more would be sought after."¹The good life is an activity (not skill or desire) or a series of activities which are intrinsically worthwhile. These pursuits are good in themselves and depend on no extrinsic rewards or enticements to motivate 'would-be' participants. However, it is necessary, even in the best state, for the citizens to engage in various occupations or vocations to provide the physical requirements of food, clothing and shelter. This sort of work, disparagingly termed "toil" by Aristotle, serves only as a means to the life of cultivated leisure. Typing, walking a beat, or welding are not activities, which once undertaken, preclude the participants having further aspirations extrinsic to them. The typist, policeman and welder have aims or purposes which go beyond their particular activity, like getting married, becoming a detective, or becoming a vocational 'educator'. Clearly, there is no universal agreement on what happiness is, (as the song says, "it's different things to different people") as Aristotle states,

each man decides for himself following his own character and disposition, the finest character choosing the highest kind of enjoyment on the loftiest plane.²

The good life is not pursued only when one becomes engaged, gains a promotion or bursary, it is a life-long undertaking which depends upon

¹William Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of Education, (Chicago: Scott Foresman & Co., 1965), p. 21.

²Aristotle, The Politics, T. A. Sinclair (trans.), (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 302.

character rather than skill or political connections.

Since the good life for any individual and, collectively, for the state is dependent upon goodness of character, the questions of "what is character?" and "how is it acquired?" must be answered. Character is comprised of intellectual and moral dispositions which enable the possessor to select and engage in activities of intrinsic worth. Character is developed primarily by education, with supplemental boosts from nature and good fortune. As a result, we may say that the principal aim of education is the cultivation of certain excellent intellectual and moral traits of character, which enable and dispose the person to participate in the good life. Inasmuch as Aristotle holds that only two sorts of activities are intrinsically worthwhile, we must consider those dispositions, mental qualities, or character traits, that enable one to pursue these involvements, as being the principal and highest aims of the process of education. These I would like to discuss in some detail, since many other tendencies are dependent upon and follow from these traits.

The two kinds of activity which are good in themselves are intellectually excellent thought and morally excellent action. In Aristotle's view, thought and action in the good man, should be under the guidance of the intellect; the former directly, the latter by implication. In order to live the good life, the student must have certain intellectual powers cultivated which would enable and dispose him

to participate in a life of cultivated leisure. Theoretical thinking is the first activity which is good in itself, but to think properly in this manner, one must have theoretical wisdom. Good and right conduct is the consequence of noble and excellent thoughts. The process of thought revolving around conduct is "practical thinking"; and to think nobly, one must have "practical wisdom". Consequently, the cultivation of "theoretical wisdom" and the development of "practical wisdom" are the two major aims of education, which expedite the good life and bring happiness.

Theoretical wisdom³ is composed of two distinct elements or qualities; intuitive reason and scientific knowledge. Intuitive reason may be described as the ability to know and understand basic principles and concepts. In the case of theory, this tendency may be revealed in the student's capability to grasp or make sense of the conceptual framework of say, physics or mathematics. This insight into first principles sketches the particular perspective within which the thought will be conducted. Intuition is not merely a facility one gains by having a framework explained to him and which he masters by rehearsal, like the five postulates of Euclidean Geometry. What Aristotle desires is that the student himself, long after he has departed the warm and secure confines of the classroom with its smiling and reassuring teacher, shall be capable and desirous of seeking out and understand the first

³See Aristotle, Ethics, John Warrington (ed. and trans.), (New York: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1963), pp. 125 - 127.

principles of many disciplines, or conceptual frameworks within disciplines.

Scientific knowledge⁴ is not a compendium of the facts of physics, biology or mathematics, it is not available in magazines, journals or newspapers, rather, Aristotle thinks, it is "a disposition by virtue of which we demonstrate". Knowledge involves a knowing of certain first principles which are always and everywhere true. Scientific knowledge is the power to deduce conclusions, given certain premises. Developing scientific knowledge may be seen as skill at a particular aspect of theoretical thinking. The knowledge is present at this stage, and what remains is to operate on it and transform it logically in a variety of ways, and draw conclusions from it. All too often, in the name of knowledge, contemporary educators concentrate on the quantity of information that the student can amass; and, in the name of competence or facility, they regard the products of rote memory as satisfactory achievements.

The integration of intuitive reason and scientific knowledge yields a higher order disposition which Aristotle terms "theoretical wisdom".⁵ A man who knows only the first principles and basic concepts of mathematics, but who is unable to move from this point to conclusions, is unlikely to be described as "educated". By the same token,

⁴Ibid., pp. 125 - 127, 122.

⁵Ibid., pp. 125 - 127.

the teacher who is capable of solving all of the problems in the textbook, but who cannot give the rationale for selecting his procedures, is unlikely to fair too well in the class of those who have been 'educated' in the Aristotelean sense. Theoretical thinking, like other kinds of thought, aims at finding the truth. Theoretical thought seeks the truth for its own sake, not for making money or as a basis of conduct. This, the highest form of thought, is not concerned with human life though it can foster the highest sense of personal well-being or happiness. A man is taught to think theoretically only in order that he attain theoretical wisdom. This disposition, mental quality or psychological trait is the primary aim of education.

Practical wisdom,⁶ unlike its theoretical counterpart, involves thinking, not because it is worthwhile in itself, but because it is a precondition for good and noble conduct. Practical thought engages the intellect in acting, feeling and choosing. Due to differences in individual character and life circumstances or environment, the kind of emotions, desires, and behaviour that a man will exhibit are, to some extent, a personal matter. Thus, there can be no certain and necessary truths which rest upon contingencies of place, time, and the 'human element'. However, a man must act in concert with reason, rather than from whim and fancy. Practical wisdom is "a true and reasoned disposition towards

⁶Ibid., pp. 123 - 125.

action with regard to things good and bad for men."⁷ All action must be guided by a consideration of the "good life in general" and "what is good and expedient for oneself". Consequently, practical thought requires certain assumptions about the human good and factual information regarding individual circumstances.

Education must, in fostering this facet of wisdom, impart an ability to assess and evaluate those facts relevant to particular actions, while passing on principles of good conduct under which the particulars may be subsumed. It is not enough to tell the student that gum chewing, sleeping in class, and reading the Communist Manifesto are bad sorts of things to do, it must be explained to him why these actions are undesirable, by invoking if possible the principles of the human good. If the student can apprehend the principles, conduct the reasoning himself and arrive at the same conclusions regarding good conduct, we would characterize him as practically wise. It must be emphasized that thinking is concerned with truth and not with popular opinion which is so frequently utilized to "gentle the masses". Conditioning cannot replace education nor can Skinner's rats replace men of practical wisdom.

Wisdom, in regard to conduct, is divisible into three categories; politics, economics and ethics.⁸ The application of thought, in any of

⁷ Ibid., p. 124.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 131 - 132.

these areas, is in the province of practical thought. In education, we are particularly concerned with the life of the individual, and as a consequence, the relation of practical wisdom and moral virtue or ethics must be seen as an important one.

According to Aristotle, practical wisdom in regard to moral virtue "is a rational disposition that grasps the truth about actions in relation to what is good or bad for human beings".⁹ An individual cannot be a good man without practical wisdom, nor can a man be practically wise without the aid of virtue. Practical wisdom in this sense, is intimately bound up with what a man knows, and how a man acts on the basis of a particular sort of knowledge. To be morally virtuous is to possess a disposition or series of dispositions which enable and commit a man to do good and noble acts. Noble actions are the constituents of the second form of intrinsically worthwhile activity, and therefore as elements of the good life, are capable of generating happiness.

An educated man, in this framework, must have acquired knowledge, or be disposed to acquire knowledge regarding what is good for human beings. Being in possession of this knowledge the man of virtue tends to act in accordance with it. For example, an educated man may be said to be tolerant if he knows that tolerance is good, and because it is good he tends to act in this way. The uneducated person may pay lip-service

⁹Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of Education, op. cit., p. 35.

to generosity and any number of other moral qualities, but unless his allegiance is reflected in his thought and conduct, any claim to goodness is without substance. To be virtuous, a man must be able to give a rational account of his conduct and indicate how his action represents the mean between excess and defect. "Virtue is the mean", in Aristotle's estimation, and, to act morally, one must choose the mean. After the mean has been arrived at by deliberation, the virtuous man is committed to act on it because it is good. Consequently, virtue is more than knowing the good, it must entail a disposition, or readiness to act, in conformity with the good. Noble thoughts, or acts, alone do not the good man make. Character involves the harmonious relation of deliberation and deed, which may be likened to building a bridge. If only one half of the structure is completed, it fails to serve its purpose, while total completion is a necessary condition for its worth. The contemplative aspect of character, in regard to virtue, must be united with the conduct of the individual, if virtue is to be transported from thought into action.

The aims of The Ethics and The Politics are the good life, i.e., an individual and collective attempt to pursue the life of cultivated leisure. Education is the process which enables the individual and the state, as a whole, to become happy by preparing individuals to engage in intrinsically worthwhile activities. Consequently, the aim of the pedagogical process must be the fostering of those traits of character

which will allow the educated man to engage in intellectually excellent thought and secondly, to do morally excellent acts.

CHAPTER IV

JOHN LOCKE

John Locke discusses the outcomes of education in a series of letters written to Edward Clark regarding the care and education of his children. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, his recommendations are directed toward a particular class of child, and as such they are not linked directly to political or social theory. It is the case, however, that Some Thoughts Concerning Education is closely connected to Locke's general philosophical position. For example, Gay¹ argues that Locke's educational ideas are inextricably connected to the epistemological and psychological theories put forward in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in that his pedagogical notions reflect his empiricist world view.

The impact of the Lockean rejection of the doctrine of innate ideas upon educational theory, since that time, has been profound. By stressing the importance of experience in the acquisition of knowledge and in the intellectual and moral development of man, Locke has placed much of the responsibility for this growth on the process of education. Locke also recognized that individual differences should be considered

¹Gay, P., Introduction to Some Thoughts Concerning Education, (New York: Teachers College Columbia University, 1964), p. 5.

in making decisions regarding the way in which children are to be educated.

Since his correspondence was directed to an upper class Englishman it seems clear that Locke did not intend that his recommendations should have universal application. In other words, Locke was primarily concerned with the education of some individuals in a particular situation, rather than the education of the whole society.

Locke addresses his treatise Some Thoughts Concerning Education to an English gentleman who is desirous of having his son become "civic-minded, well-mannered and soundly informed". The importance of education, in his view, is that,

of all the men we meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education. It is that which makes the great difference in mankind.²

Primarily, this concept of education manifests a concern with what a child will become; i.e., the sort of character he will have, rather than any particular job he will be fitted for. In Locke's view, it is education instead of nature or fortune that is the most significant factor in determining what the child will become.

In contrast to Plato and Aristotle, Locke's pedagogical ideas are not directly related to the conception of the state or even to a single

²John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Peter Gay (ed.), (New York: Teachers College Columbia University, 1964), p. 20.

class in society. Indeed, it seemed to have never occurred to him that all children should be educated, or that those to be educated should be treated in exactly the same way. In Locke's view, while methods, contents and objectives of the curriculum are to be devised with regard to individual differences in children, all educational aims are to be expressed in terms of what the child will become. The young gentleman should have a character which embodies virtue, wisdom, breeding and learning.³ These are 'inward' personal qualities, not merely 'outward' social graces such as the habit of uttering the right thing at the proper time. A man who is virtuous, good and able, "must be made so within" through his education, in order that he direct his life by "habits woven into the very principles of his nature".⁴

Of the four traits of character that Locke considers the principal ends of education, virtue is paramount.

It is virtue then, direct virtue which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education;... All other considerations and accomplishments should give way and be postponed to this.⁵

In order to gain the respect and trust of others, the gentleman must acquire a certain number of ethical attitudes which enable him to tolerate and accept himself. Such attitudes provide the basis of the individual's virtue both personal and social.

³Ibid., p. 99.

⁴Ibid., p. 31.

⁵Ibid., p. 53.

The foundation of goodness in the gentleman is a "gentle but courageous religiosity" brought about by instruction in the Judeo-Christian ethic.⁶ Locke believes that by instilling in the child love and respect resting upon a "true notion of God" the way can be paved for developing those qualities of mind contributing to virtue. As inward conditions of the individual temper the qualities then will have a gentle but firm effect on the outward bearing of the person.

As a consequence of religious training the child learns to love and respect others. According to Locke, one who has been able to develop this state of mind has become "good natured". Having such an attitude further enables one to act morally in relation to others because of an awareness of and a regard for human dignity. One necessary attribute for demonstrating respect for human dignity is honesty.

Locke holds that an honest man must speak the truth. Telling the truth, to some degree, presupposes that the individual has been educated and is thereby both able and willing to make true utterances. Consequently, fostering this disposition is developing a tendency to be truthful when one knows the truth.

In developing virtue, education must concern itself with inculcating such specific moral qualities as truthfulness, honesty and respect for mankind. It is only when these traits of character have been soundly established that a man can be said to be a truly good man. Virtue based

⁶Ibid., pp. 11, 99 - 102.

upon reason is the coping-stone of all education.

Virtue is conceived as the power of denying oneself satisfaction in regard to desires which reason does not authorize. When the student has had this principle placed uppermost in his mind, and when he truly accepts it and is willing to live by it, then and only then, is he capable of being virtuous. A young man can do the right thing regularly because he has been indoctrinated with a standard code of conduct based upon the mores of the society in which he is born. But, observance of mores is not identifiable with having a moral character, nor is good conduct indicative of the exercise of reason. There is something superficial about a man who gives to charity because others do, or who pays pseudo-allegiance to worthwhile activities, but fails to participate in them. Virtue is something more profound and enduring because it arises from a natural flow between the "temper of mind" and the overt conduct. In Locke's view, the gentleman will display a grace of personality because he is aware that he is behaving well, and it comes easily. It would appear that those, in whom reason remains comparatively undeveloped, would never be able to become virtuous, although they may never do anything that is morally wrong. Without goodness of character which is rooted in reason, the remainder of the qualities of a gentleman e.g., wisdom, breeding, and learning become devoid of value or worthwhile use. They are merely facades to cover the character of a man who, in fact, has no character. Locke recognizes that there are a great many other states

of mind which may be subsumed under and fostered in relation to virtue, but his primary interest is in giving general comments, making allowance for individual temperament and circumstance.

The second quality important to a young English gentleman is wisdom.⁷ A wise man is one who is able to apply his mind and his experience, in concert, to his business. This trait is a product of what Locke calls "good natural temper", indicating that he conceives of it as something very intimately connected with his whole personality. To educate a person so that he may act with wisdom, it is necessary that he be made capable of understanding and anticipating the ends of his actions, supplementing his reasoning on present undertakings by reflecting on his past activities. Understanding involves knowledge; in the case of wisdom, it is knowledge of how one's business is to be managed. This trait is not to be confused with the aims of courses in business administration or the like. By a man's business, Locke means his life and affairs in the office, in the classroom or in his private life. Like virtue, wisdom is something deeply rooted in the character of the man who possesses it. It should be clearly distinguished from such "skin-deep" qualities as cunning, shrewdness or cleverness. The schools today are filled with clever children who, unless they receive proper training and instruction, will become only cunning instead of being truly wise.

⁷Ibid., pp. 102 - 103.

The combination of time, experience, observation and acquaintance with the characteristics of other men supports the knowledge the student acquires and enables him to act with reason and foresight.

Good-breeding is the third character-trait that Locke holds the student must acquire in and through his education.⁸ The quality of good-breeding manifests itself in two distinct ways: in regard to personal deportment, and in the way in which we treat other people. Both facets of this quality are to be exercised jointly in the gentleman's social relationships. In regard to the individual student, he must become modest, which Locke seems to think lies midway between conceit on the one hand, and self-debasement, on the other. He is one who thinks well enough of himself that he has a willingness to accept praise when it has been duly earned, without taking any credit away from others. Also, an educated man is able to discharge the duties of his position with composure, while respecting the position and circumstances of others. Such modesty and poise are apparent in the person who acts with grace and freedom, in a way that he becomes acceptable to associates and friends. Education, in Locke's view, must attempt to give the student self-confidence, but this cannot be achieved if teachers persist in "putting the student in his place" with various forms of character assassination and ridicule. One may indicate to a student that he is mistaken, or that his

⁸Ibid., pp. 103 - 108.

information is incorrect, but there is no necessity in calling him 'stupid' or accusing him of being a 'liar'.

The second aspect of good-breeding is demonstrated in how the educated man receives others, and the esteem that he accords them. This facility Locke regards as dependent upon two essential components, "first a disposition of the mind not to offend others; and secondly the most acceptable and agreeable way of expressing that disposition".⁹ The character-trait which is referred to as an "internal civility of mind", is the springboard of all expressions of courtesy and deference. It is this which must be cultivated before one may be described as 'civil'. The inner quality of the mind is the precondition for the observable activities which indicate the well-fashioned person. Knowledge of traditions and customs of various societies is necessary in order that one be capable of expressing good-breeding in the most desirable way. Surely, the uneducated traveller is likely to be clumsy and disrespectful to others, purely on the basis of a lack of knowledge alone, despite noble intentions. However, even if he is well informed, his knowledge is of no avail unless he possesses "good will and regard for all people" which disposes him to act in accord with knowledge and reason. Good-breeding, which is to be aimed at in the gentleman's education, is a "social virtue", that is to say, it enables him to be comfortable in

⁹ Ibid., p. 104.

social relationships, while making others feel at ease. Virtue, in the moral sense, is at the heart of this state of mind, in that it depends upon a regard for humanity. In short, Locke views good-breeding, i.e., self-respect and esteem of others, as an essential goal to be realized by pedagogical means. It is founded upon distinguishable elements of goodness of character and knowledge, therefore, it is not derivable from conditioning and opinion.

Once virtue, wisdom and good-breeding have been thoroughly instilled in the character of the student, then is the proper time for learning, and not before. Many contemporary educators would have one believe that learning is to be given highest priority. The conception of learning, articulated in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, is strikingly unlike current popular notions.¹⁰ Learning, to Locke, is not to be identifiable with the teacher gorging the student on information, in order to write departmental examinations or 'to make a showing' on television quiz programs. Learning is a disposition or tendency, not a compartmentalized assortment of facts and figures. "To raise the child on love and esteem of knowledge"¹¹ is what must be aimed at in education. Once the state of mind is cultivated, the child may learn for himself without the enticement of good grades and 'noble' rewards. It must also

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 108 - 109.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 161.

be realized, Locke asserts, that learning is to be developed only after virtue and wisdom. Without the latter qualities the knowledgeable man will be more corrupt and foolish. The student was not and never shall be a computer; consequently, concern with developing character must replace the absurdity of glutting his memory with trivia in the name of learning.

The education of the son of an English gentleman may differ, in terms of the content and the teaching methods employed, from the training given in present day schools. However, it cannot be overstated that virtue, wisdom, good-breeding and learning, as aims, remain as significant today as they were in the time of Locke. Indeed, with increased emphasis on training in occupational and vocational skills, brought about by the technological age, the significance of character, as an outcome of education, is greatly magnified. We are approaching an era in which a man may pursue as many as three different jobs in his occupational career. Education cannot possibly foresee what these jobs might be and prepare the student for them. Even if such foresight were possible, a highly skilled machinist will never replace a good and wise man, or education's primary concern with what is worthwhile should never be usurped by what is useful.

CHAPTER V

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU

Rousseau develops his pedagogical views by considering the education of a single child named 'Emile'. Yet, much of what he says in Emile is clearly intended to apply to the practice of education generally. Historically speaking, there is little doubt that Rousseau's thought did, in fact, exert a profound influence on theories of education.

By regarding a man as good by nature, he caused education to be seen as positive and enlightening rather than negative and oppressive. In other words, a child who is innately good at birth needs only to be permitted to develop his natural tendencies to retain his essential goodness. On the other hand, a child regarded as inherently evil can only be educated by suppressing his natural inclinations. If all men possess this potential goodness, then according to Rousseau, they are equal in this respect. Consequently, 'nature' supplies the framework within which children are educated in such a way as they will be able to retain their 'natural' goodness.

Rousseau's fundamental distrust of a decadent society permeates much of his viewpoint in Emile. It is because of his rejection of the values of the existing social order, that his pupil is not allowed to enter into social relationships until advanced stages of training and development. Since the "state of nature" is assumed to be good, Emile

must be educated outside the harmful confines of its moral antithesis, namely, society. This insures that the moral character of the child will be preserved and strengthened before he enters into relations with members of society. Through education the natural personality of the learner is secured against any corrupting forces that might come from social intercourse.

In his psychology, Rousseau draws attention to the developmental stages through which the child passes on the way to maturity. Each stage is characterized by the dominance of a distinct set of natural impulses. As a result, different aspects of the students personality are nurtured at each level, consonant with the prevalent tendencies. In this sense then, it can be said that education follows the lead of nature.

Foremost in the social and political thought of Rousseau is the underlying dichotomy of nature and the social order; "God makes all things good: man meddles with them and they become evil".¹ This statement implies that man is born naturally good but society, in pushing, pulling and bending the individual for its purposes, causes him to become distorted and evil (i.e., unnatural). In the framework of Emile, 'nature' functions as a moral concept by associating goodness with that which is untainted by society. To employ the concept in this fashion is,

¹Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile, Barbara Foxley (trans.), (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1955), p. 5.

in Rousseau's view, to provide the basis of human equality; the principal objective of his social and political thought. Customs and traditions of the social order have been warped by the greed of a few, thereby precluding the possibility of finding a social basis of equality. To combat and overwhelm evil, Emile must be insulated from society and allowed to unfold in accordance with nature in order that he may, above everything else, become a good man.

Education comes to man from three sources; nature, men, and things.² Nature means the physiological development of the body, including organs and faculties. This process is almost entirely beyond man's control, and therefore its direction must be respected and followed in the training of the individual. This activity which Rousseau calls the "education of nature", is synonymous with maturation. To the extent that it lies beyond anything more than indirect control, it may be described as natural and therefore does not constitute education in the ordinary sense. We may observe the life cycle of a butterfly, even supply it with proper food to sustain it, but we would not claim that we were responsible for its education. Nor would we, Rousseau says, make such an assumption with regard to a child even though he may be named 'Emile'.

The second source of education is from men. In Rousseau's view,

²Ibid., p. 6.

"the education of men" involves the cultivation of the faculties of the child in such a manner that they compliment his natural or innate tendencies. That is to say, if the child is naturally good at birth, then education involves nurturing these natural inclinations, rather than suppressing the seeds of evil, as was promulgated in the doctrine of original sin. Extreme caution must be shown in this aspect of the child's development as his goodness may be destroyed by contact with undesirable influences. Consequently, a man of the right character must be chosen for this role; one whose nature has not been corrupted by society will be given the solemn responsibility for this aspect of Emile's education.

The third source of Emile's education is supplied by "the education of things". This is training to be received through interaction with the physical environment. The child learns here by experience and observation.

A good man is the product of the harmonious integration of these three modes of education. A unity of this sort may only be achieved by cultivating the individual for himself and not for others. This point is highly significant in the history of education where like Locke, Rousseau is placing the emphasis on the individual, quite apart from the role he may play as a citizen, or as a member of society's labour force.

Since nature is beyond our control, and human relationships and experience submit only partially to our direction, we must depend on

good fortune to fully realize our intentions. No one would rationally intend to climb Mount Everest while on crutches, nor could someone hope to make the ascent without favourable climatic conditions and adequate food supplies. Rousseau's point is that one intends to do those things over which one has some control and that despite adequate planning, our intentions may be misconceived or fail due to unforeseen contingencies. To be a good man, Emile requires the benefit of favourable circumstances at all turns in the road to maturity. Character, as is the case with other ends in this pedagogical system, requires the benefit of fortune and sound intentions if it is to be correctly formed.

The emphasis placed upon the natural growth of the child necessitates the separation of the educative process into five distinct stages in accordance with this physiological and psychological development. Recent stress on this conception of child development in psychology (notably in the work of Piaget) has initiated a revitalization of Rousseau's position. However, contemporary educationists have seen fit to pass over considerations of character in favour of quantitative variables of "achievement" which are less recalcitrant to testing and measurement than traits of character. The first two years of the child's life, described as the period of 'infancy', are marked only by feelings of pleasure and pain. 'Boyhood', age two to twelve, is dominated by the development of the senses. Reason emerges during 'youth', the stage from twelve to fifteen years. In 'adolescence' the predominant feature of

maturation is the emergence of the emotions lasting until the twentieth year. With the onset of 'maturity' (age twenty to twenty-five) formal education comes to its conclusion. By this time Emile has acquired a feeling of personal well-being and a concern for the well-being of others.

Inasmuch as each stage in the development of the child is typified by the supremacy of some group of natural tendencies, it follows that the objectives at each level will differ with regard to their degree of sophistication. We could not expect to produce the same effects in the infant as in the youth or vice-versa. However, this view was not held prior to the time of Locke and Rousseau, where the child was considered to be a miniature adult. At the completion of each stage the necessary foundation has been prepared upon which further qualities may be erected. The mature Emile is the product of the cumulative aims achieved at prior levels of education. The moral view of nature, hence, necessarily involves a conception of education which is directed toward the creation of a good man, possessing certain desirable traits of character.

Our concern is with traits of character, mental qualities, states of mind and so on, as they are seen to be appropriate aims of the process of education. Rousseau points out that these ends may be realized only after the natural faculties of the child have been developed.³

³Ibid., p. 57.

A child only becomes generous when his nature disposes him to do generous acts. Character development, in this view, must be seen as a process of vigilant insulation from the evils of men and society. In this sense, education from the teacher's point of view may be seen as negative. That is to say, the teacher does not teach but by maintaining favourable circumstances enables the student to learn a great deal. The aim of the educator is not to actively work toward fostering generosity but to energetically prevent the learner from becoming greedy. Prior to age twelve, the child is shielded from prejudices and habits which may permanently impede his becoming a good man. To enable Emile to become virtuous, good habits are nurtured by preventing the development of undesirable ones.

Self-restraint is an essential quality to be inculcated before the end of childhood.⁴ By aligning one's personal desires with one's capabilities, there is a reduction in the tendency to seek what one does not have the power of achieving. Restraint thereby heightens the possibility of happiness, a trademark of an individual in the 'state of nature'. The only moral precept the child learns is "never hurt anyone".⁵ By developing self-restraint and a desire to treat others well, education in infancy and childhood, aims at insuring that the child isn't overburdened with a multitude of social niceties that some may consider

⁴Ibid., p. 44 - 45.

⁵Ibid., p. 69.

'cute' and 'adorable' in the miniature adult.

Youth marks the advent of reason and with it comes the flowering of learning and Emile's personal virtues. Like Locke, Rousseau conceives of learning as a taste for the acquisition of knowledge, and does not equate it with filling an empty storage compartment with knowledge.⁶ Of course, some information must be employed to plant the seeds of curiosity, but too much fertilizer nurtures the weeds of boredom and fatigue that may snuff out the life of those plants which would possess the most desirable blossoms. A love of truth, at this stage is sufficient to enable Emile to value knowledge and motivate him to seek it as the need arises.

Another disposition to be fostered during youth, is wisdom. Wisdom, at this point is limited to discerning good and evil as it pertains to Emile himself, since he is lacking in knowledge of social relations.⁷ Ultimately, this trait will become the underpinning of social morality when the time comes for Emile to be with other persons. Rousseau has remarked that, during boyhood, the child is to be encouraged not to hurt anyone. However, this attitude was fostered by habit and, until now, has remained unenlightened by reason. However, at this level, this and other principles become internal dispositions as opposed to an external guide to conduct. Other personal attributes which become

⁶Ibid., pp. 134 - 135.

⁷Ibid., p. 149.

manifest at the conclusion of youth are industry, temperance, patience, steadfastness and courage.⁸

The appearance of the emotions, combined with increased physiological development, signals the onset of adolescence. In the course of change from infancy to the present, Emile has possessed one passion from which all other emotions issue - namely, self-love.⁹ This propensity is not to be construed as selfishness, which is undesirable, but rather it is synonymous with what is referred to, in contemporary psychoanalytic terminology, as 'self-acceptance' or 'self-respect'. As the child grows, this tendency enables him to love those who treat him well and thereby satisfy his personal desires. During the early stages of development, this trait was merely habit, now it has been replaced by a feeling of kindness toward the species guided by reason. According to Rousseau, the adolescent does not "love without reason or prefer without comparisons",¹⁰ both of which are based on knowledge. This, then, is the time to foster those dispositions which follow naturally from Emile's dawning moral awareness. Instead of assuming Aristotle's position that good and noble actions earmark the virtuous man, Rousseau believes that trifles, rather than great deeds, reveal the best character.¹¹ Wisdom, in dealing with passions, is one such character-trait

⁸ Ibid , p. 170.

⁹ Ibid., p. 174.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 175.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 203.

to be advanced at this level. To be wise, it is necessary

First to be conscious of the true relations of man in both the species and in the individual and second to control all the affections in regard to these relations.¹²

Wisdom endows the individual with the desire to be moral in regard to small things as well as in those of more prominence, in things personal as well as those which are social. Rousseau's conception gives morality a common denominator which is found in the personality of the individual, thus unifying the Platonic distinction of civic and personal virtue.

Pity, generosity, mercy, and modesty are additional qualities which should be nurtured in adolescence. The distinctive feature of each of these traits is that they exist apart from norms present in any society. In the "state of nature", the person is trained to "respect the individual and despise the multitude". Consequently, dispositions are not logical predicates, descriptive of observable social behaviour alone, but are actual tendencies truly present in the character of Emile. His morality is derived from a kindly disposition rather than meticulous adherence to convention. Conscience enables him to judge his actions and the behaviour of those around him, and wisdom enables him to conduct himself accordingly.

The final stage, in Emile's unfolding, has made him ready to enter

¹²Ibid., p. 180.

society and to study civil relations with his fellow men. In society, he will become a citizen possessed of certain duties and responsibilities and, in time, a husband and father. All of these roles he will perform well because education has maintained his natural goodness. He is virtuous because he can control his emotions by following his reason and conscience; he is a master of himself. By maintaining self-control, he is able to be free and happy, not being subject to the winds of discontent that reek havoc upon the character of ordinary men. The purpose of Emile's education has been to develop good habits and dispositions early in life, and when he has become what he ought to be, these attitudes will empower him to remain so.¹³ Reason is the coping-stone of his character and the most significant aim of education. Rousseau has shown little concern with the development of the knowledgeable well informed young men who go out to seek their fortune in the world of business or industry. What kind of man will Emile be? Will he be able to find employment? How can he be happy if he cannot afford to feed himself? Rousseau's reply is,

It matters little to me whether my pupil is intended for the army, the church, or the law. Before his parents chose a calling for him nature called him to be a man. Life is the trade I would teach him. When he leaves me, I grant you, he will be neither a magistrate, a soldier, nor a priest; he will be a

¹³Ibid., p. 395.

man. All that becomes a man he will learn as quickly as another. In vain fate will change his station, he will always be in his right place.¹⁴

To be a man is not to be a shoemaker, a judge or the principal of an elementary school. Living is not identifiable with shoemaking, adjudicating or administering, or even teaching. By the same token, education, in Rousseau's view, is not an instrument for life adjustment; if this were true, Emile would have been trained in a public school. Living a good life is distinct from existing to bring home money to sustain the household. Emile is a child of nature who has been nurtured in accordance with her laws, and has received a degree in living. Learning a vocation or trade will come easily to him because he is readily disposed to learn.

Rousseau's conception of 'nature' must be considered as a romantic oversimplification. However, from a historical point of view, it may be seen as a reaction to the doctrine of original sin. By arguing that all which comes from the hands of God, or nature, is good, he is able to provide a common basis for both equality and morality. Today, the commonly held position is that the child is neither good nor evil at birth, he is what all those who surround him want him to become. A teacher is not a watchman who protects his character from the tarnishing effect of others. He is intentionally doing certain things to bring

¹⁴Ibid., p. 18.

about certain ends with regard to the child. He becomes a man or not, only because other men want or have wanted him to do so.

CHAPTER VI

IMMANUEL KANT

Kant's educational theory in general consists of normative recommendations about "what actually belongs to a good education". These proposals, in his view, are related directly or by implication to the paramount aim of education, namely, "to make good men - who will rightly". From this perspective, education is concerned with the person, i.e., the development of the child's character for his own sake, and not directly for any political or social reasons. Kant regards the individual as worthwhile in his own right quite apart from any instrumental value he may have for the political or social order after he has been educated.

As a consequence of Kant's regard for the individual, he treats education independently of political and social considerations. His little known book Education is therefore the primary source of his educational thought. However, his epistemological and ethical theories seem relevant to his views on education. Thus, if one requires further explication of Kant's views in all these realms, one must examine some of his other works.

The intellectual aspect of the Kantian scheme of education brings in elements of his epistemological and psychological theories. The primary purpose of this component of the child's training is the develop-

ment of the faculties of intelligence, reason, judgement and so on. These powers provide the roots of social virtue and morality.

The person is again the foremost consideration in the inculcation of moral and social virtues. Morality, in Kant's view, is based on a sense of duty to oneself and to others. In this manner moral training, like its intellectual counterpart, is closely associated with the development of the individual's personality. Consequently, Kant's ethical views on the nature of individual freedom, based as they are, on the acceptance of certain maxims, are very much a part of his theory of education.

Every human being is born with natural gifts which, when fully developed, distinguish man from other animals. These endowments, Kant thinks, do not mature spontaneously of their own accord as Rousseau has suggested, but must be activated by those who have themselves been educated. Education is necessary in order to foster mental and physical skills, "Man only becomes man by education, he is merely what education makes of him".¹ The concern here is not with how much money a man will earn, or how much knowledge he will have acquired; it is with what kind of man he will become. An 'educated' man, in the Kantian framework has, above all else, character, i.e., certain intellectual and moral qualities that are not to be found in the untutored.

Kant's conception of the process of education involves two very

¹Immanuel Kant, Education, Annette Churton (trans.) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964), p. 6.

broad elements, the physical and the practical.² Physical education is directed at nature and involves nurture and discipline. I shall not discuss this aspect in any detail as it is essentially a preparation for the intentional positive function of education. Suffice it to say, that it consists of the care and feeding of the infant, and involves preventing him from using his powers in a way harmful to himself, thereby forestalling the development of undesirable habits.

Practical education, which includes developing intellectual skills, discretion and moral training, aims ultimately at freedom. This aspect is both positive and intentional because it involves the instilling of a number of specific dispositions or psychological traits at different stages of development. Mental aptitudes are the foundation of 'discretion' or 'prudence'³ and these are, in turn, the necessary preconditions for moral qualities.

Kant separates mental skills into two categories: one made up of those which belong to the 'lower' mental faculties of intelligence, imagination, memory, the senses and so on; the other containing those which form part of the 'higher' powers of understanding, reason and judgement.⁴ The 'inferior' faculties are to be trained in relation to, and with a view to developing the 'superior'.

²Ibid., p. 95.

³William K. Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of Education (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965), pp. 91, 205n.

⁴Kant, Education, pp. 70 - 79.

The lower intellectual faculties are to be trained by exercise. That is, the skills belonging to intelligence are fostered by having the individual engage in those sorts of activity which require the use of intelligence, and so on for other intellectual skills. This view of the development of mental aptitudes appears to be similar to training muscles for tennis, or developing reflexes for various other physical activities by disciplining them. This conception of 'mental discipline', which is unpopular with most contemporary psychologists, draws attention to an important point; that being able to remember "The Rhyme of the Ancient Mariner", or the elements of the periodic table, by itself is not enough; what is to be desired is that the student will develop facility or skill in using the memory. There seems to be little point in fostering good memory alone. A person with a sound memory but who lacks intelligence, reason and understanding may still be a fool. An educated man is one who is capable of exercising intelligence, memory and imagination in concert if the occasion calls for it.

'Higher' and 'lower' intellectual aptitudes do not result from merely being in possession of certain psycho-physiological mechanisms, but are the upshot of being able to wield these faculties in various ways. A good golfer has more than a set of clubs; he has the knowledge and skills necessary to use these clubs in particular ways. Consequently, in the course of a student's education he must acquire a good deal of knowledge and come to be the possessor of certain desirable dispositions

related to both 'higher' and 'lower' faculties of the mind. Once the 'lower' powers have been thoroughly developed, they provide the base upon which understanding, reason and judgement are to be constructed.

In the Kantian framework, understanding is defined as knowledge of general rules and principles.⁵ Understanding outstrips knowledge since it calls for a conscious awareness and acceptance of rules and principles. A man may superstitiously believe that rain results from the tears of the gods; an 'educated' man understands the principles of meteorology by which precipitation may be explained. It is in this sense that he knows why it rains. Similarly, a man may know that his television set is in need of repair, without understanding the electronic principles governing its operation. Such principles are not 'out there' in some repair manual, but through education, they have become part of the individual's conceptual framework. To understand certain principles is to have a different sort of outlook than one who is unaware of their existence. Understanding is an attitude or disposition closely associated with reason.

According to Kant, the faculty of reason enables one to grasp the relation of the general and the particular.⁶ Thus, the student becomes capable of, for example, understanding the connection between the prin-

⁵Ibid., pp. 71, 79 - 80.

⁶Ibid., pp. 71 - 79, 79 - 82.

ciples of behaviouristic psychology and an account of the acquisition of particular mathematical skills through programmed learning. Again, like understanding, the development of reason consists in cultivating the faculty and facility in its employment. To foster an aptitude for understanding the relation of general rules and specific instances where these principles hold is another aim of education. An educated man through reason is able to 'see' how the principles of electronics relate to his particular television set which is malfunctioning.

Judgement, not only enables the educated man to know the principles of electronics and to understand how they are related to his set; it makes him capable of applying his knowledge and understanding to carry out its repair. Judgement, in Kant's view, is the ability to apply principles to specific instances.⁷ It is facility in application that distinguishes judging from understanding and reasoning. It involves, for example, knowing certain principles of teaching, understanding how they relate to classroom situations, and actually applying them in particular circumstances. Judgement is, therefore, not the mere possession of information, it is the disposition to utilize it, if and when it is required.

Although knowledge and information are indispensable to the development of understanding, reason and judgement, taken by themselves, are of

⁷Ibid., pp. 71 - 79.

little value. The expression "intellectual skills" describes something about the manner in which one operates with certain mental properties. If one's performance falls below certain standards we would not characterize him as 'reasonable' or as 'capable of exercising judgement' and so on. To educate is just to bring these performances up to certain standards, in other words, to transform the intellectual life and perspective of the person. Kant seems to be primarily concerned, however, with the moral aspect of education since he considers only briefly the intellectual elements of the process. These qualities are nevertheless essential preconditions for the development of discretion and morality.

A person may have acquired all of the necessary intellectual powers and yet be unable to carry on satisfactory social relationships. By being discrete,⁸ that is, by having developed "the faculty of using our abilities aright", Kant believes that one can live in society, be liked and gain influence. Discretion or prudence in social intercourse is composed of a number of subordinate propensities.

It is important that an educated man be well-mannered and courteous in his associations with others. Without these elements of discretion such an individual would lack refinement. Since conventions which define courtesy and mannerliness change from culture to culture, the prudent man should be aware of such differences in convention and conduct himself

⁸Ibid., pp. 19, 31, 95.

accordingly.

An educated man would not be expected to be possessed of a violent or uncontrollable temper. According to Kant, a person gains influence and respect by concealing his own feelings while being conscious and considerate of the feelings of those with whom he is associating. This aspect of prudent conduct is referred to as 'decorum'.

Bravery or strength of character in interpersonal relationships is manifested by the exercise of the will. An educated man stands by certain principles and may try to convince others to see his point of view. But Kant holds that the exercise of 'bravery' must never take the form of violence. On the otherhand, one who continually acquiesces, i.e., who is unwilling to take a stand, is described as 'apathetic' and must be regarded as weak of character.

In fostering the emotional elements of personality, education is concerned with developing discretion in conduct. Restraint, decorum and bravery are properties of such behaviour which lead to a man's becoming acceptable among other cultured men. Social refinement, in addition to intellectual prowess, are indispensable attributes of a man's character that must be acquired en route to his becoming moral.

Moral training is the culminating phase in the educational process; it is the pinnacle of formal education. Prior to reaching this level, the child is prepared for it by nurture and discipline, in addition to the development of his intellectual capabilities. Kant says that

'Practical' or 'moral' training is that which teaches a man how to live as a free being... This is the education of a personal character, of a free being, who is able to maintain himself, and to take his proper place in society, keeping at the same time a proper sense of his own individuality.⁹

Morality and freedom are inseparably linked and consequently to develop one, one must necessarily develop the other. Moral training thus involves developing a sense of self-respect and a willingness to conduct ones social enterprises in a responsible manner, which ultimately entails fostering character.¹⁰

Freedom, in Kant's view, is the result of coming to understand and accept certain maxims, combined with a readiness to act in accordance with them. Principles of good and evil must be stamped into the character in such a way that they enter into and intimately restructure the very nature of the person. Freedom cannot be attained by learning a manifesto of good conduct and storing it away in a vault for future reference. Maxims must transform character in the same way that combining two chemicals yields a new compound not present before the union. Character, says Kant, isn't merely a host of good resolutions and noble thoughts, rather it is "the firm purpose to accomplish something, and then also in the actual accomplishing of it". In this way, good intentions are inseparably linked with good conduct. A common statement, in contemporary

⁹ Ibid., p. 30.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 30, 84, 98 - 99.

education, may serve to exemplify the kind of disparity between thought and deed, which Kant is desirous of eliminating. A teacher who says: "yes, I understand that multiple-choice questions are not the best measure of achievement, but I chose them because they are easier to mark", is a case in point. The claim that this "teacher?" lacks education, and by implication character, may not be well received yet from the Kantian perspective, it is nonetheless true.

The sort of education that empowers the mind to think and prepares the person to act in accordance with maxims must follow specific principles in the formation of character. The maxims are, for the child, maxims of the school, which in the course of years, become the maxims of mankind. Such training must be characterized by thoroughness as opposed to superficiality, quality instead of quantity.

The first rule is that a child learn to obey.¹¹ This is a passive acceptance of rules in the beginning which later matures into a willing compliance with reason. Obedience, in the educated man, is a voluntary submission to rules of conduct, even though his desires would lead him elsewhere. A student who recognizes that it may be to his advantage to cheat on his examinations, yet refrains from doing so, may be said to be exercising this trait of character.

The second tenet to be observed in forming an individual's character

¹¹Ibid., pp. 85 - 90.

is that he must be truthful.¹² One disposed to lie, even infrequently, has no character, according to Kant.

Thirdly, a child should be encouraged to form friendships.¹³ These childhood liasons pave the way for adult relationships in society and develop his propensity to be sociable. A hermit is unlikely to be possessed of a proper sense of individuality or a tendency to respect other human beings.

Obedience, truthfulness and sociableness are three essential guides to be followed in character development, but Kant sees further steps that must be taken in moral education.¹⁴ Wise moderation is part of the core of morality. This disposition is a part of all aspects of personal conduct and social behaviour. It enables the person to be moderate regarding his desires and wise in his reaction to others. The educated man has learned to spend within his income and continues to do so despite opposition. His education must make him sensitive to and aware of the feelings and circumstances of others. In this way, he may be described as an 'activist', committed to improving the well-being of others.

The principles of morality to be inculcated and the steps to be taken in their nurture all hinge, ultimately, on a sense of duty. To

¹²Ibid., pp. 91 - 92.

¹³Ibid., p. 92.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 97 - 98.

Kant, character and, hence, morality are intimately tied to the person's understanding of what his duties are and his voluntary intention to fulfill them. Duties are separable into two categories: a person's duties to oneself, and duties to others, i.e., mankind.¹⁵ Education must, Kant thinks, infuse in every person an awareness of human dignity and firm resolve, never to act contrary to it. This trait may be manifested in the qualities of temperance with regard to food and drink, and the maintenance of personal integrity in social relations. A drunkard or a glutton defile their self-respect and are, in fact, denying their human worth. In the same vein, the individual who degrades himself publicly, by wearing long hair and refusing to wash, is no better off.

A man has duties to his friends and to mankind. Beating the neighbour's child stealing the landlord's flower pots and denying the Negroes their rights, are all examples of a failure to respect and revere the dignity of others. This state of mind must be reflected in one's actions. Many teachers have been heard to say, "I provide for individual differences, but I must teach to the 'middle' of the class". Quite apart from the difficulty in making sense of the expression 'the middle of the class', there seems to be an implicit disregard for student capabilities and, by implication, their personal dignity.

For Kant, there is one supreme principle of morality from which all

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 100 - 103.

duties follow and, therefore, to which all character-traits must conform. It may be seen as the fundamental concept without which the term 'character' is meaningless. It is a disposition to "Act only on maxims which you can will to be universal laws", which Kant calls the "categorical imperative".¹⁶ One who follows this tenet must understand himself and humanity and conduct himself so that he neither harms or degrades either. Education, aiming at character development, must seek to have the person 'internalize' this and all other moral principles. Rather than paying token lip service to ethical platitudes, these are to be the moral framework of the individual's personality. Despite the fact that we may disagree with some of the maxims Kant has articulated, or conjecture regarding their application, we cannot overlook the importance of such dispositions as aims of his educational scheme.

Man is not by nature a moral being, he only becomes moral "when his reason has developed ideas of duty and law".¹⁷ Since both law and duty are at once personal and universal, we cannot train a man to be an Edmontonian, an Albertan, or a Canadian exclusively. His perspective must become universal, his concern mankind, and his hope the progress of humanity. Education, therefore, aims at acquisition of knowledge and skills, but most crucially, for Kant, the development of character.

¹⁶ Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of Education, p. 107.

¹⁷ Kant, Education, p. 108.

CHAPTER VII

MATTHEW ARNOLD

Matthew Arnold was not a philosopher in the technical sense. He is well-known as a poet and an educator. Arnold's relevance to the subject of education derives from the fact that he was a sensitive person and a man of culture. As an inspector of schools, he acquired an awareness of the shortcomings of British education in the context of a society oriented toward outwardly material pursuits. Culture and Anarchy is both a critique of the existent political and social order as well as a plea for a return to activities and modes of thought related to enlightenment.

During the time of Arnold the rise of industry had concentrated national interest on "external culture" in a manner similar to current technological expansion. In the social order there was civil unrest comparable to some extent to the worldwide social unrest of today.

In the sphere of education, Arnold championed the cause for secondary and university education for the middle class, since at that time, such was available only to a privileged few. Simultaneously and most significantly, I think, he advocated a return to "sweetness and light". According to Arnold, "culture" is concerned with fostering an 'inward' state of mind which is both sweet and enlightened. The concern of education is directed toward the sort of person the child will become,

in terms of the attitudes and appreciations that he will gradually come to possess. External culture, on the otherhand, is more interested in the kinds of things that the student can do, such as taking a job, learning a trade and so on.

Culture and Anarchy places the role of education in the area of enlightenment as opposed to an instrument of political or social expedience. The outcomes are seen in terms of the individual's "inward condition of mind and spirit". In this way, Arnold implies that the outcomes of education can be expressed in terms of certain worthwhile intellectual and moral dispositions.

Culture and Anarchy is an attack upon a British society which had become preoccupied with technology and with economic progress. Arnold felt that the return to an enlightened social and political order was possible only through the process of education. There are some important parallels between our contemporary society and the one which confronted Matthew Arnold a century ago. The conception of education, having aims in terms of traits of character, shows a marked similarity to those of his predecessors, particularly Aristotle and Locke, and indicates a foresight into the problems and difficulties faced by a modern society caught in the throes of a vast technological revolution.

Education, in this framework, is properly "the study of perfection", which is given the name "culture".¹ This study entails reading, observ-

¹Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, J.D. Wilson (ed.) (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 45.

ing and thinking about "the best which has been known and thought in the world" in such fields as art, science, history, philosophy and religion. Culture, in its quest to determine the nature of perfection and to make it prevail, is not committed to stocking the labour force, or to training devoted and humble citizens. Thought or knowledge is not a saleable asset, but "eminently something individual, and of our own; the more we possess it as strictly our own, the more power it has on us."²

Education is concerned with the person, the perfection of the individual, by a "harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature". Education is not something one has, in the sense of having a home, a car and a library, after which one rests and decides what else to acquire. The search for perfection entails that one is continually "growing and becoming", i.e., growing and becoming more perfect. Culture aims at fostering the beginnings of the desire for perfection in each individual; that is, cultivating an "inward condition of the mind and spirit".³ Vocational skills and occupational capabilities are mere "outward circumstances", unrelated to the core of personality, and strictly speaking, do not fall within the province of education. From the point of view of Matthew Arnold, education is that which aims at cultivating certain "inward" qualities of character, which enable the individual to learn the nature of perfection

²Ibid., p. 171.

³Ibid., p. 49.

and dispose him to make it prevail.

The two leading qualities that make possible the individual's pursuance of perfection are, a "scientific passion" and a "passion for doing good". Each is seen as a state of mind which, when brought to the fulness of maturity by education, give the possessor a character exuding "sweetness and light". Therefore, the ultimate perfection of culture is attained when the character of those being educated bears the markings of sweetness and light.

The "scientific passion for knowing" is characterized by the "sheer desire to see things as they are".⁴ This disposition is, in certain respects, similar to Aristotle's "theoretical wisdom"; both involve obtaining knowledge for its own sake. The role of education, in regard to this element of personality, is most important today. Newspapers, television, magazines and, indeed, textbooks approach the world from some bias or perspective and the educated man must be willing to search for and capable of finding truth in a sea of opinion. The educator's attempts to foster inquisitiveness and a critical outlook are further complicated by various groups and agencies, outside the school, who deem it their responsibility to foist dogmatic preconceptions on to the younger generations. In his efforts to present knowledge, the teacher ultimately winds up treading on the toes of a large number of community members,

⁴Ibid., p. 45.

and most importantly, further confusing the already muddled outlook that the student has. The point is that the task of generating the desire to know the truth may be greatly simplified if education were left strictly to those who know the truth, or know how to get at it. 'Wisdom', 'reason' and 'intelligence' are terms which are used by Arnold to describe this facet of the personality of an educated man.

The second element of personality, to be developed simultaneously with the desire for knowledge, entails the social and moral qualities contributing to sweetness and light. As an "inward" condition of the mind and spirit, the tendency to conduct oneself well, socially and morally, rests upon knowing what good behaviour is. At the same time, the ease with which good deeds are performed gives them the quality of being 'genuine' or 'natural'. Arnold has a strong dislike of the pretentious and superficial, which helps him to envision some of the aims of culture. According to him, the mask is not a part of the attire of the educated man. Conduct, which flows from knowledge is, from a moral and social point of view, more commendable than meaningless social and moral graces balanced precariously on beliefs, which may tumble with a change in the climate of opinion.

A number of rather specific dispositions are shown to be constituents of the broad "passion for doing good". Loving ones neighbour is that quality of good character which finds expression in actions carried out in a manner respectful of human dignity. As such, this behaviour must be tempered by knowledge about mankind, and freed of

ethnic, political, racial and religious prejudices. Secondly, one must seek, in and through his actions, to remove human error and confusion. This would seem to be a concern with human welfare which would follow from a love of man. The third characteristic of the socially and morally cultured man is closely connected to the first two. The desire to alleviate human suffering must rest upon a sincere concern for the well-being of others. This is not to imply that each student must acquire the convictions of Albert Schweitzer or Florence Nightingale. The view that Arnold advocates is that: each person, in his particular area of competence, and in regard to those things about which he has acquired the truth, should be disposed to use his fullest capabilities to remove human misery. The moral traits of character discussed here provide a frame of reference within which social qualities may be nurtured.

The man of culture has, in the course of his education, become the bearer of certain intellectual, moral and social elements of personality. Each quality acts as a 'motive' in his quest for perfection; "the noble aspiration to leave the world a better and happier place than we found it."⁵ Sweetness and light radiates from one who knows perfection and how to act to attain perfection. From Arnold's point of view, education

⁵Ibid., p. 44.

is not a tool designed for life adjustment, but a process by which man strives for enlightenment in terms of a social and moral order not yet existing.

The manifestations of this inward condition of mind and spirit, called 'sweetness and light', are associated with seeking the truth, learning it once it has been found, and ultimately, making it prevail.⁶ According to Arnold, one who knows the truth and appreciates real beauty is, thereby, disposed to make reason, and the will of God, prevail. A curriculum, whose goals reflect an excessive concern with the useful at the expense of the worthwhile, or which substitutes training for character development, will effectively extinguish knowledge and beauty by neglecting sweetness and light.

Sweetness and light, resulting from harmony of character, is brought about through,

a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world; and through this knowledge turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits, which we now follow staunchly, which makes up for the mischief of following them mechanically.⁷

⁶Ibid., p. 46.

⁷Ibid., p. 6.

This process is concerned directly with consciousness in bringing fresh and free ideas to bear on unconsciously held beliefs and opinions. The man of culture is very much like Locke's man of "gentle but courageous religiosity". In Arnold's framework, sweetness and light, when developed as the core of good character, is the ultimate outcome of education.

CHAPTER VIII

JOHN DEWEY

Much discussion regarding John Dewey's educational theory has centered around the method of problem-solving. As a consequence, the emphasis in education has fallen on the acquisition of skills and 'external' techniques of inquiry. However, Dewey points out that competent inquiry consists of methodical thinking combined with what he calls "the traits of individual method". In his view, intelligence is a critical and innovative force within the world; intelligent thought isn't the mere possession of information and techniques. It is the aptitude for doing novel things with conventional ideas that is an important aspect of intelligent thinking. As a result, intelligence is an inward and creative quality of mind.

The traits of individual method which Dewey regards as essential for competence in inquiry are not outward capabilities and skills to be assimilated by rote. Although they are to be learned by practice they become personal traits by being internalized by the learner, by becoming part of his attitudes and outlook.

The role of education in relation to fostering certain fundamental intellectual and emotional dispositions is discussed in Democracy and Education. At the same time, Dewey emphasizes the significance of individual traits in problem-solving and not only the mastery of

technique. The moral aspect of education, in relation to intelligence and competence in inquiry, is brought forth in Reconstruction in Philosophy. In this case, although for Dewey there is no distinction between fact and value, the consequences of any act of inquiry are both intellectual and moral and, therefore, attitudes of both sorts must be inculcated through education.

Dewey seems to attach a number of different senses to the term 'education'. However, for my present purpose, I shall presume to consider only one, i.e., "as a process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men".¹ These fundamental dispositions, it would appear, are elements of what Dewey calls "intelligence". Consequently, in this view, the development of intelligence, with its constituent intellectual and emotional qualities of mind, is the chief aim of education.

According to Dewey, mature intelligence in a human being shows itself in a particular manner of thinking, i.e., "reflective or scientific thinking". This process of thought involves seeking new ends and developing new means to already established ends. The most effective way that these goals can be attained is through patterning one's thought on the scientific method. That is to say, intelligent thinking employs

¹John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964), p. 328.

the method of science as a paradigm to guide reflections on present and proposed means and ends. In this sense, intelligence, when properly employed, can be seen to have both critical and creative manifestations.² The critical and creative elements of intelligence are complexes of highly integrated abilities, dispositions and attitudes which may be said to be components of the scientific outlook.

When an individual, through education, has learned to carry out a "complete act of reflective thought", that is, has developed the capability of performing an inquiry competently, he may be said to have become intelligent.³ Intelligence, in this sense, is not merely identifiable with the possession of certain facts and figures relevant to the solution of a problem, or a certain series of problems. While it is true that information is necessary in either critical or creative thought, the possession of data alone is not sufficient to be described as critical or creative. Being critical is having a particular attitude toward information, it is this outlook that separates the critical from the uncritical. The same is true of a creative bent or disposition, it is in the mind of the thinker, as a uniquely personal characteristic.

²Bhattacharrya, N.C., "The Concept of 'Intelligence' in John Dewey's Educational Theory," (unpublished paper, p. 19: to appear in Educational Theory, Spring, 1969)

³Ibid., p. 15.

Consequently, the fostering of intelligence is to be seen as cultivating the power to think in particular ways which are aided by certain attitudes, abilities and dispositions.

Being familiar with, and capable of, employing the various elements of the scientific method is not incompatible with being unimaginative; just as being the master of an extensive vocabulary is not the only quality of a creative writer. To inquire competently, one must possess both the ability and the propensity to utilize the scientific method in novel or innovative ways. To teach a student to think intelligently, one must go beyond mastery of the method and encourage particular attitudes which enable him to view life and the world in new ways. Competence in inquiry requires a number of specific personal qualities of mind. According to Dewey, these characteristics are "traits of individual method".⁴

In Dewey's view, "the specific elements of an individual's method, or way of attack upon a problem, are found ultimately in his native tendencies and his acquired habits and interests".⁵ The chief duty of education, in this regard, is in developing certain intelligent habits and fostering interests conducive to competence in inquiry. This is

⁴Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 173 - 179.

⁵Ibid., p. 173.

not to claim that the sole responsibility in this matter is to fall upon education, rather it is to indicate that education must do all that it can to encourage the student to become "direct", "open-minded", "single-minded", and "responsible". These mental qualities, in this sense, become goals or aims for which education must strive, if the educated man is to become capable of intelligent or reflective thought.

Directness, in inquiry, indicates a connection between the individual and what he is dealing with. It is a disposition to get right to the business at hand. This quality is often described as the 'power of concentration'. To be direct, requires that the individual "thinks of himself in terms of what is to be done". In solving any problem, whether it be preparing a lesson to be taught, or the actual presentation of the lesson, one must concentrate completely upon what is to be accomplished, using only those aids and techniques which lead directly to the solution. This does not mean that anecdotes or overhead projectors are ruled out, what is needed is that the teacher be capable of choosing the relevant and discarding the redundant.

The second quality essential in intelligent thinking is open-mindedness, i.e., "an active disposition to welcome points of view hitherto alien".⁶ Thinking in a critical or creative manner implies

⁶Ibid., p. 175.

that new alternatives are being considered and that stock notions are being re-examined. An educated person is not the sort who clings to myths and fairy tales which have been shown to be false. Open-mindedness is active in conducting inquiry and should not be confused with 'empty-headedness' which is passive and indiscriminate in its acceptance of points of view.

Dewey reckons that two principal factors which inhibit open-mindedness are obsessive preoccupation with 'red-tape' and routine, and the desire for results. To have an open mind is to be capable of selecting alternate plans and procedures as variations in circumstances demand. For example, one would not approach the teaching of mathematics in exactly the same way for two different classes of unlike students. Being open-minded implies having a flexibility of method and purpose. Similarly, if one is concerned only with seeking good grades, in the course of educating students, one is unlikely to be innovative in the presentation and development of a variety of perspectives.

Single-mindedness, the third character-trait comprising individual method, denotes "completeness of interest" or "unity of purpose".⁷ This quality of mind is closely associated with directness in the exercise of intelligent thought. Being single-minded is being completely

⁷ Ibid., p. 176.

involved in and committed to the subject matter of thought for its own sake. A scientific attitude is important because it is useful in its own right and not because it enables those who have acquired it to gain higher paying jobs. According to Dewey, in the absence of this disposition, one merely acts from ulterior motives, with no evident convictions.

To foster this unity of purpose, the student being educated must be given a sense of intellectual involvement with the subject matter of the curriculum. This does not imply that he be constantly in motion or permanently engaged in say, spelling drills. Rather, the activities, overt or covert, in which he participates, must involve him in thinking as opposed to routine doing, creating and criticising as distinct from blindly repeating.

Dewey defines responsibility as,

the disposition to consider in advance the probable consequences of any projected step and deliberately accept them: to accept them in the sense of taking them into account, acknowledging them in action, not yielding a mere verbal assent.⁸

As an intellectual attitude, responsibility implies a disposition to accept the consequences of ones thoughts and actions. Being responsible, in this manner, entails that one stand by and follow through on plans or

⁸Ibid., p. 178.

proposals as they are developed by thought. Thus, if a member of parliament knows that gun laws will reduce the number of murders in Canada and fails to pursue legislation to this effect, he is not acting in a responsible fashion. Responsibility, like other traits of method, are inner traits of personality as distinct from a highly polished "outer veneer".

The above four qualities of personality relating to intelligent inquiry are predominately intellectual dispositions. Though Dewey makes no distinction between the scientific and the moral, fact and value, his emotional dispositions are clearly moral virtues. In his words,

The prime need of every person at present is capacity to think (intelligence); the power to see problems, to relate facts to them, to use and enjoy ideas. If a young man or woman comes from school with this power, all other things may be in time added to him. He⁹ will find himself intellectually and morally.

Competent inquiry must be supported by certain moral qualities which show the right course of action in solving problems which have initiated the inquiry. It, therefore, seems that education, in fostering certain fundamental emotional dispositions, is ultimately laying the foundations of and for morality.

⁹William K. Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies Of Education (Chicago: Scott Foresman and Company, 1965), p. 147.

Some of the mental qualities belonging to the emotional element of intelligence are,

Wide sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence in the face of the disagreeable, balance of interests enabling us to undertake the work of analysis and decision intelligently are the distinctly moral traits -- the virtues or moral excellencies.¹⁰

In inquiring into good means and ends for one's thought and actions, these fundamental emotional dispositions, along with others such as faithfulness, enable one to think and act in relation to other human beings. Dewey believes that to conduct oneself in this manner is to work for the common good of man.

Wide sympathy in thought and its manifestation in one's conduct would appear to be similar to Russell's concept of 'abstract sympathy'. To inquire intelligently requires that the individual be aware of and responsive, in an appropriate way, to the conditions and difficulties of others widely removed from oneself. This would seem to indicate that the student must be given knowledge of men and nations outside of his own. Along with such knowledge, education must build, into the very fibre of the individual's nature, a tendency to be sympathetic. Closely connected with a sympathetic attitude is a sensitiveness to those things which would arouse sympathy.

¹⁰ John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1957), p. 164.

To take the rights and claims of others into consideration in thinking and acting is another characteristic of the exercise of intelligent inquiry. A keen sensitiveness to rights and claims of this sort involves the recognition of these factors in deliberating about plans or proposals for conduct. To consider these factors is not, however, to allow them to be the sole spring of action. One must weigh many other elements prior to acting and it is the tendency to recognize these aspects of a situation that separates the sensitive from the insensitive. While fostering sympathy and sensitiveness, education must also seek to develop a willingness to continue in the face of adversity.

In Dewey's view, one who persists in the face of the disagreeable, may be characterized as having 'courage'. Such a disposition enables the sympathetic and sensitive person to pursue a plan or proposal for action which may lead him into situations which he regards as painful in order to bring about good consequences. A student should be made to realize that there are many disagreeable persons and circumstances that one must encounter and endure in the pursuit of good ends. Courage involves a commitment to the results and consequences derived from intelligent inquiry. Sympathy, sensitiveness and courage would appear to be elements related to a broader emotional state of mind faithfulness.¹¹

¹¹Frankena, Three Historical Philosophies of Education, pp. 148 - 149.

Every fundamental emotional disposition connected with intelligent inquiry bears upon human associations and relationships. Being faithful involves being aware of various social pressures which, to some extent, structure the nature of parent-child, teacher-student and similar sorts of affiliations. In each case, the individuals involved have certain rights and privileges while, at the same time, being subject to certain expectations and demands. In order that the individual will develop this quality,

education should both make us aware of these realities of human associations, these rights and demands of others, and foster a sense of obligation to be faithful in respecting them.¹²

In this sense, faithfulness can be seen as a tendency to frame one's thought and action in terms of the common good of all. It involves being sympathetic toward other members of such associations, being sensitive in regard to their rights and claims, and having the courage to stand by one's convictions once established in relation to the common good. Being faithful implies more than possessing good intentions, founded upon the results of scientific inquiry; most significantly, it entails a disposition to act in such a way as to contribute to the common good.

¹²Ibid., p. 149.

In Dewey's view, the task of education is the development of fundamental intellectual and emotional dispositions which are part and parcel of intelligent inquiry. Each mental quality is an element of an outlook on life and the world, which is referred to variously as the "scientific temper of mind", "the scientific attitude", "the scientific outlook" and so on. In the sense that these intellectual and emotional qualities may be seen as desirable outcomes of the process of education, they may be described as the aims of education. Thus, in the description of an educated man, a man of intelligence, we are required to adopt a variety of dispositional qualities in order to pick out the desirable attributes upon which competent inquiry rests.

CHAPTER IX

BERTRAND RUSSELL

Bertrand Russell's theory of education is centered on the rights of the student; giving the individual as much freedom as possible while providing him with suitable and worthwhile instruction. His fundamental concern with human freedom has led him to attack many dogmatic and narrow-minded principles and practices which are now present or which have been present in education. In The Place of Science in a Liberal Education, Russell rejects the notion that a sound cultural outlook can be acquired through a liberal education in the arts alone. In his view, science can contribute as much or more than the study of the 'classical curriculum' can to the perspective of an educated man.

In focusing upon the individual in his talk about education, Russell is concerned not only with the acquisition of knowledge but with the cultivation of a personal outlook on life and the world. In The Aims of Education, Russell specifies some of the traits of character which, in his view, contribute to a broad outlook. The importance of such qualities in the context of his social theory is that they should be possessed by all who have been or who are now being educated. Of course, such attitudes will be possessed in varying degrees by different persons dependent upon individual differences in ability and character. Russell's point is, however, that education cannot be narrowly conceived, in terms of methods, contents and procedures alone, if the outcomes are

to be desirable in such a way as they contribute to social reconstruction.

Russell suggests that the conception of the kind of person one wants the child to become describes the framework within which the student will be educated. The aims of education, expressed in terms of character traits, mental qualities, attitudes and so on, dictate the sorts of processes and procedures that will be undertaken to bring about these ends. According to Russell, 'education' is defined,

as the formation, by means of instruction, of
certain mental habits and a certain outlook
on life and the world.¹

To foster the mental habits and the sort of perspective that are most desirable, the student is to be given instruction as opposed to preaching. Preaching usually aims at bringing about an immediate modification of behaviour without regard to other circumstances, or is directed to cultivating an exclusive set of ethnic or religious attitudes. In either case, the scope of the outlook can scarcely said to be broad enough to cover life and the world. Such means as brain-washing or conditioning are most frequently employed to further certain highly specific political, religious or social goals by intentionally restricting the learner's point of view to one state, one church or one

¹Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic, (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1957), pp. 35 - 36.

society. Instruction is as unconcerned with salvation as it is with socio-political ascendancy. Instruction, to foster a world view and an attitude toward life, must focus upon certain dispositions to be cultivated if desirable goals are to be reached. Thus, we may say that, in the Russellian sense of the term, 'education' aims at fostering certain desirable personality traits and attitudes.

Russell holds that there are four qualities which jointly form the basis of the ideal character; vitality, courage, sensitiveness, and intelligence.² These intellectual and moral propensities stand as universal aims of education over and above any particular kind of knowledge or skills that may be required in the performance of one's chosen occupation in life. Indeed, such qualities of mind are essential if one is to transcend the boundaries of narrow political demarcation and cultural inheritance and possess appropriate attitudes toward the world and mankind.

Vitality of character is present in one who feels that it is good to be alive. Such a sense of well-being can enthusiasm, Russell suggests, is primarily physiological in origin. Consequently, if education is to foster such a trait, the methods and content and, particularly, the instructor must possess and exude the same zeal. The monotonous

²Bertrand Russell, On Education Especially in Early Childhood, (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1926), p. 35.

voice of the teacher, who daily reads her twenty year old notes to her students so that they can pass the "departmentals", is unlikely to foster much more than boredom. The athletic coach, teaching physical education classes, in the hope of discovering recruits, is not the sort of person who will encourage participation in activities for the sake of enjoyment alone.

Vitality is a disposition whose exercise is not restricted to one activity, but its influence pervades the whole person, whether on the job or in the area of recreation. The educated man's enthusiasm takes him beyond himself and facilitates his interest in whatever occurs. He becomes "objective" because his concern is focused beyond the boundaries of his physical self. However, one who is vital is not necessarily one who has been educated. It is probable that many members of the Klu Klux Klan are very enthusiastic about their activities, but they will certainly be lacking in such dispositions as courage, sensitivity, and intelligence. It is also possible to distinguish two sorts of vitality, physical and mental. It is conceivable that a man who is physically handicapped is interested in and enthused about being alive and engaging in a variety of intellectual pursuits. The significance of Russell's claim is that, the sense of well-being must be developed in conjunction with other attitudes.

To be "courageous", a person must combine two qualities of

mind, self-respect and an impersonal outlook on life.³ Courage is a psychological trait which enables the individual to live without fears, rational or irrational, conscious or unconscious.

Self-respect is the trademark of a man who "lives within", and not an outward badge of pomp. The student who attends university in response to the expectations and pleas of parents and teachers, conducts himself to the tunes of others. To respect his self, the individual must act in accordance with knowledge and beliefs 'within' his character, which he accepts and understands as things of worth. An educated man has an attitude of regard towards himself because he is worthy of respect in his own eyes. Such a state of mind would be impossible for a teacher who indoctrinates his students knowingly, because members of the local school board have persuaded him to. Courage, in this sense, is the courage of knowing one's own convictions and standing by them.

An impersonal outlook on life prevents the self-respecting individual from becoming conceited. This aspect of courage balances the tendency to become overburdened by ego. People who continually ask "What's in it for me?", are those who live in a world bounded by their own skin. An educated man has interests ranging far beyond the satisfaction of his personal desires, and acts from motives that are not always reducible to egotistic hedonism. Courage, as Russell sees it,

³Ibid., pp. 38 - 39.

involves seeing oneself as a small but worthy part of life and the world. The "social climber", the "money-grubber" and the drug addict share a common inordinate preoccupation with the self, having but one goal, personal pleasure. The same is true of those who believe that their way of life must be forced upon succeeding generations, (a task which cannot be accomplished by those 'foreign teachers') these too are to be found guilty of cowardice in the court of education. The quality of courage, which Russell is advocating, is inspired by vitality and tempered by sensitiveness and intelligence.

The third quality Russell requires of an ideal character is sensitiveness. An individual is described as sensitive if he is disposed to respond emotionally to a wide range of emotion-inducing stimuli. To be desirable, the responses engendered by such stimuli must be appropriate to the circumstances, which is not identifiable with "mere intensity".⁴ Sensitiveness, in Russell's view, is a mental quality requiring knowledge that enables the educated man to be affected "pleasurably or the reverse by many things, and by the right things".

A fundamental type of emotional sensitiveness is the trait of sympathy. To be characterized as 'sympathetic', one must be sensitive

⁴ Ibid., p. 39.

to the problems and difficulties of those who are not only close friends and relatives. For example, a principal should be understanding of the difficulties of new students who do not speak the same language as the majority of those in the school. These stimuli are relatively close at hand, even though one may not be personally acquainted with the objects of sympathy. The second facet of sympathy is the emotion that is felt when suffering is known to be going on but not immediately present. Being concerned about war or the hungry people thousands of miles distant is, Russell thinks, a kind of sensitiveness to abstract stimuli. The educated man is one who displays concern for mankind as a whole and not merely for those with whom he is personally familiar.

Sensitiveness, as a state of mind, also has a cognitive component which is closely connected to the quality of intelligence. It is an awareness of what is going on around you, fostered by the habit of observation. Teachers, who distribute the identical homework sheets to their classes today, that they did ten years ago, are not sensitive to the changes that are going on around them. To become sensitive is, however, not to become educated; this disposition must be fostered jointly with vitality and courage, and in harmony with intelligence.

From Russell's point of view, the final, and perhaps the most important aim of education, is the cultivation of intelligence. The intelligent man is one who has an attitude primarily for acquiring

knowledge, and only secondarily, has stock-piled a certain amount of information. The state of mind is the lasting propensity, enduring long after much of the knowledge has been forgotten. Contemporary educators seem to be increasingly aware of the importance of developing the students ability to learn rather than trying to see how much he can remember. New courses in mathematics, physics, and chemistry seem to be directed at familiarizing the individual with the framework of the discipline. Previously, the teachers were concerned, for the most part, with distinct segmented bits of knowledge unsupported by a unifying rationale.

The well-spring of this facet of the intellectual life is curiosity; not the kind of tendency which characterizes the voyeur, but that which motivates the cat to explore every nook and cranny of an unfamiliar room. Due to the increasing complexity of the world, the best that any educator can hope to accomplish is to plant the seeds of curiosity and cultivate the skills necessary to allow the seeds to grow to maturity and bear fruit. Most of the knowledge that any individual accumulates will be of his own doing and in accord with his personal attitudes and appreciations. Consequently, education must inculcate a curiosity for knowledge which rests upon a belief in the possibility of knowledge, habits of observation, and character which is both industrious and patient.

Higher levels of intelligence are manifested in curiosity about

general propositions instead of a concern about particular facts.

In Russell's view, the higher the degree of intelligence, the more abstract or general are the propositions about which the intelligent person is curious.

Knowledge of general propositions dissociates the intelligence possessed by the educated man from concern only with personal gain. To acquire an outlook on life and the world, the student must be "open-minded" and capable of assuming new perspectives with the growth of his knowledge. A man is not educated once-and-for-all with regard to intelligence; indeed, through his training, he is put in a position where he assumes responsibility for acquiring knowledge of life and the world.

According to Russell, educational aims seem to be expressed in terms of character-traits that structure the process which brings these goals into being. Vitality, courage, sensitiveness and intelligence are qualities which are to be anchored in the personality of the student, to remain long after methods and contents have been forgotten.

CHAPTER X

RICHARD PETERS

Peters views education as 'initiation' into a heritage of public activity and thought which it has taken our ancestors centuries to accumulate and develop. By adopting this metaphor to characterize the processes by which an individual comes to be on the inside of a variety of worthwhile undertakings he is rejecting a number of more popular models. In Peters' paper "Education as Initiation", he draws attention to the difficulties in conceiving the process as one of growth. He also views with disdain those notions of 'education' which emphasize the instrumental character of its achievements.

Peters thinks there are certain attitudes and appreciations which the learner must come to possess if he is to move to the inside of this heritage. He further explicates the intellectual and moral qualities giving content to the concept of an 'educated man' in two papers; "The Aims of Education - A Conceptual Inquiry" and, "What is an Educational Process?". These attainments distinguish the initiated from the uninitiated, the 'educated' from those who are 'uneducated'. Peters' conception of education entails both knowledge and attitudinal transformation. He also says that education is more directly concerned with what is worthwhile in itself and not as it contributes to external ends. The attitudes and states of mind acquired through the mastering

of principles and standards implicit in say, history or science are, in his view, so important that knowing the subjects alone would make one merely a 'knowledgeable' person not an 'educated' man.

Peters sets out directly to lay down, through analysis, the conceptual guidelines within which 'education' and 'aims' have application and to point up the relationship between these concepts. According to Peters, 'education' - "refers to no particular process; rather it encapsulates criteria to which anyone of a family of processes must conform".¹ The concept "education" is employed, broadly speaking, in the characterization of various tasks, called 'processes of education', and of those achievements which culminate in an individual becoming 'educated'. Thus, Peters talks about 'education' having a 'task sense' and an 'achievement sense'.²

The task sense of 'education' marks off such processes as; instruction, teaching, training, etc., which, providing they come up to certain standards, contribute to the individual's gradually becoming educated. In this way, it is possible to speak about teaching students without being committed to the further assertion that they are being

¹Richard S. Peters, "What is an Educational Process" in R. S. Peters (ed.), The Concept of Education, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 1.

²Ibid., p. 1.

educated. A student may have information passed on to him by hypnosis, but we would want to say that such processes are not 'educative' because the recipient does not know what is going on. In other words, if these processes fail to meet a number of intellectual and moral requirements we may reject the notion of their being 'educational'.

"Education", in the achievement sense, picks out those qualities which give content to the concept of an 'educated man'. Since a person is not born with 'wisdom' or 'sweetness and light', he must be involved in various processes of education which are intended to "initiate" him into or get him going in various forms of life and thought, and which culminate in the learner's becoming wise or possessing sweetness and light. In Peters' view, the teacher is already on the inside of worthwhile forms of thought and it is his duty to gradually bring the student to this perspective. The achievements of gradually becoming 'educated' are those of the learner, while the teacher may succeed or fail in teaching. Thus, we may speak of having taught a student, but cannot logically talk of having educated him. In the same way a man may have coached a runner, but the achievement of winning a race belongs to the runner and not the one who has trained him to run.

In viewing 'education' as a family of tasks, and related achievements which characterize the 'educated man', talk seems, naturally enough to come around to a discussion of 'aims'. According to Peters, the achievements of the learner are thought of as objectives to be

'aimed at', thus giving content and direction to process of education. In this view, 'aims' are conceptually connected to 'education', thus drawing attention to the intrinsic character of such achievements. Just as the targets of shooting and throwing lie within the field of aim, so must the achievements at which teacher and learner 'aim' fall within the sights of their activities. Often it is the case that we hear statements to the effect that 'the aim of education is economic progress' or 'education should aim at social control'. Claims of this sort place achievements to be attained beyond the scope of education and consequently, these objectives are extrinsic to education, and cannot logically be said to be 'aims of education'. On the otherhand, statements like 'the aim of education is developing the intellect' are tautological. In Peters' view, in uttering this assertion we are making no claim upon fact, we are merely picking out a conceptual component already contained in 'education'. "Aims" are thus the achievements made in the course of being initiated into, and gradually coming to master, worthwhile activities and forms of thought. These achievements fall within the conceptual boundaries of 'education' and are not the sorts of things that are to be connected to the economic or social sphere.

From his analysis, Peters delineates certain criteria that the tasks and achievements involved in initiation are to come up to if these are to be characterized as 'educational'. These standards sketch a

framework within which processes of education can be conducted and wherein educational achievements can be pursued. Standards contained in the concept of 'education', fall into two categories; those which are descriptive of the successful outcomes of 'education', and those which characterize the processes which contribute to a learners gradually becoming educated.³ The criteria of the first sort, therefore, pertain to those sorts of achievements which give content to the notion of an educated man, that is to say, which characterize his outlook and form of life. The processes of education, which are structured in relation to these outcomes, are subject to certain other criteria in the form of intellectual and moral principles governing the activities in which teacher and learner engage.

The achievements, that are deemed by Peters to be the most significant outcomes of 'education', are a number of reasonably specific and desirable states of mind.⁴ These qualities of mind colour the outlook of an educated man and govern the activities he pursues, his conduct, his feelings and his judgements. Peters employs the metaphor "initiation" to characterize the processes by which an individual is brought into desirable forms of life and thought, which in time

³Richard S. Peters, "Aims of Education- A Conceptual Inquiry" in Philosophy and Education: Proceedings of the International Seminar, Monograph Series No.3 (Toronto: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1967), p. 4.

⁴Ibid., pp. 26, 5 - 12.

he will come to master.⁵ "Education" thus consists in the learners becoming involved in what is desirable. A person may come to be the master of various techniques of safe-cracking but we would not want to say that he had been 'educated'. "Education" has desirability built into it in such a way that to claim that "My son has been educated but nothing desirable has happened to him" is to assert a contradiction.

The dispositions fostered by involvement with worthwhile forms of life and thought are essential to the concept of an 'educated man', such that should any one of them be absent, we would withhold the description 'educated'. Consequently, to say that a man is 'educated' is tantamount to saying that he has acquired certain attitudes towards worthwhile forms of life and thought. These attitudes are closely related to one another and in each case are intimately connected with knowledge.

One may be a highly accomplished concert pianist or a master of a number of other eminently worthwhile skills, without being an educated man. In Peters' view,

being educated demands more than being highly skilled. An educated man must also possess some body of knowledge and some kind of conceptual scheme to raise this above the

⁵For a discussion, see R.S. Peters, "Education as Initiation" in R.D. Archambault (ed.), Philosophical Analysis and Education, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 87 - 111.

level of a collection of disjointed facts.⁶

The possession of certain skills or 'know-how' leaves open the possibility that these skills, and the knowledge they involve, have been 'pigeon-holed' off from each other and lack organization or structure. To say that someone has become 'educated' is to imply that the knowledge he or she possesses has become organized into some sort of conceptual scheme. Having developed this conceptual scheme, through being engaged in various processes of education, the individual is enabled to structure other information to which he may be exposed.

There is , however, no incompatibility with not being 'educated', while still being well informed or very knowledgeable. Simply knowing various "vignettes of living history" does not enable one to understand how such episodes are related to each other. To be educated requires some understanding of principles, by which disparate facts can be organized and connected in a meaningful way. Understanding a conceptual scheme (or schema), or knowing the 'reason why' of things goes beyond the mere description and accumulation of data and lays the grid for explanation. For example, an individual may have memorized the methods of solving a large majority of problems in calculus; yet when someone asks him why he employed a particular approach, he is unable to supply the rationale for his choice. An 'educated man' is able to cope,

⁶R.S. Peters, "Aims of Education - A Conceptual Inquiry", *op. cit.*, p. 7.

on his own, with both standard and novel circumstances because he understands how the novel relates to the familiar. In this way, understanding is based upon knowledge, but it outstrips knowledge in that it is intimately woven into the fabric of the individual's personality, giving him an outlook which is truly his own. Such a point of view is not restricted to one particular area, but may be an achievement relative to any number of tasks involved in the developement of an educated man.

It is the mark of an 'educated man' that he continues to pursue the worthwhile activities, into which he has been "initiated", long after his formal schooling has come to an end. To be "initiated" into forms of thought, such as English-Literature, history or science, is to get on the inside of them in such a way that one's outlook is transformed by them. Enjoying a good novel is not the same thing as reading a book to review it in the local newspaper in order to earn a living. An 'educated man' enjoys the activity, in itself, quite apart from any instrumental value it may have. To be on the inside of English-Literature, is more than knowing and understanding a good deal about prose and poetry, "it must involve the kind of commitment which comes through being on the inside of a form of thought and awareness".⁷ Coming to care about a form of life and thought gives point to knowledge and under-

⁷R. S. Peters, "What is an Educational Process?", op. cit., p. 8.

standing. It makes being 'educated' something personal as opposed to external; active instead of passive. "Caring" is an attitude which enables one who has become 'educated' to enjoy history without asking 'What can I use it for?'.

Another quality essential to an 'educated man' and closely connected to knowledge, understanding and commitment is a 'cognitive perspective' or a broad sort of awareness. Peters expresses its importance in the following example,

...a man might be a very highly trained scientist, yet we might refuse to call him an educated man. This would not be because there is nothing worth-while in science; for it is a supreme example of a worthwhile activity. It could not be because such a man cares nothing about it and has no grasp for its principles; for the hypothesis is that he is dedicated to it and has a good grounding in its principles. What then is lacking which might make us withhold the description 'educated' from such a person? It is surely the possibility that he might be narrowly specialized. He might work away at science and know almost nothing of anything else and not see its connections with much else in a coherent pattern of life.⁸

Being trained in any discipline, be it history, science or sociology, is not identifiable with being educated. 'Training' implies involvement in some activity of restricted application, whereas, 'education' entails the development of an inclusive outlook. A "cognitive

⁸R. S. Peters, "Aims of Education - A Conceptual Inquiry", op. cit., p. 7.

perspective" enables one to appreciate and understand forms of worthwhile activity and thought other than his own. This does not rule out his having an expertise in some field or other, but it does require that he is able to understand how his pursuit relates to the undertakings of others. From Peters' point of view, a man who has such an "awareness" must have knowledge, and understanding of what he knows in relation to other things. He cannot simply be a "fact bank" where deposits and withdrawals are made in a routine, mechanical way. His banking cannot occur as an isolated transaction in the shadowy recesses of a singular mind, but must take place in the context of the worthwhile pursuits of those around him.

The achievement criteria, contained in the concept of 'education', which have been discussed to this point, are connected to knowledge. Peters believes that there are two ways in which knowledge is related to 'education'.⁹ In one sense, having a conceptual scheme and understanding principles places emphasis upon the content of various forms of thought that may be learned. This might be described as the substantive aspect of knowing, which would include knowing and understanding things like Ohm's law or differential equations, etc.

In another sense, knowing and understanding are "attitudinal" or

⁹ R. S. Peters "What is an Educational Process?", op. cit., p. 7.

dispositional; as in the case of having a "cognitive perspective" in regard to what one knows, and "caring" about it. The attitudinal aspect of knowledge is that which gives 'life' to information and enables it to permeate the whole outlook of the person. To say that a man has been 'educated', from this point of view, is to imply "that a man's outlook has been transformed by what he knows". Being educated, according to Peters, is not to have arrived at a destination, but to "travel with a different view".¹⁰ This conception of education draws attention to those qualities of mind which characterize the outlook of an 'educated man'. An 'educated man', he asserts, "is one whose whole range of actions, reactions and activities is gradually transformed by the deepening and widening of his understanding and his sensitivity".¹¹

The general criteria with regard to the achievements essential to an 'educated man' including desirability, knowledge and understanding, commitment and awareness, are summarized by Peters into three conceptual points,

- (i) An educated man is one whose form of life, as exhibited in his conduct, the activities to which he is committed, his judgements and feelings, is thought to be

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 8.

¹¹ R.S. Peters, "Aims of Education - A Conceptual Inquiry", op. cit., p. 8.

desirable.

(ii) Whatever he is trained to do he must have knowledge, not just knack, and an understanding of principles. His form of life must also exhibit some mastery of forms of thought and awareness, which are not harnessed purely to utilitarian or vocational purposes or completely confined to one mode.

(iii) His knowledge and understanding must not be inert either in the sense that they make no difference to his general view of the world, his actions within it and reactions to it or in the sense that they involve no concern for the standards immanent in forms of thought and awareness, as well as the ability to attain them.¹²

Peters distinguishes another class of statements, pertaining to 'growth' and 'the self-realization of the individual', which seem to be "over-all aims of education".¹³ Whereas, statements such as "to initiate man into a worthwhile form of life" are analytically true, these claims seem to be of a different sort. According to Peters, "they draw attention to a class of procedures of education rather than prescribe any specific direction or content for it". These seem to focus on the task aspect of 'education'. To speak of allowing the individual to realize himself, is to stress individual differences, the dignity of the

¹²R. S. Peters, "What Is An Educational Process?", op. cit., p. 9.

¹³R. S. Peters, "Aims of Education - A Conceptual Inquiry", op. cit., pp. 9 - 11.

individual and so on. However, these directives are usually issued when the individual is regarded as instrumental for something other than his own development: for example, when a system of education is geared toward economic or social ends, such as increasing the number of skilled-labourers or training individuals to become citizens.

The set of principles involved in the process aspect of education can be classed as first, those involving teacher and learner transactions, and secondly, principles immanent in the worthwhile forms of thought into which the child is initiated. There is first a set of general rules which have application in the context of classroom teaching. In the organization of processes of education, attention must be paid to discipline in order to sustain a situation in which both teaching and learning may occur. At the same time, the teacher must show respect for the students and permit them a certain amount of liberty, while viewing them as individuals. From the teacher's point of view, these principles govern the structuring and the distribution of education.

On the otherhand, from the student's point of view, "an essential part of moral education of children is that they should make these principles, which form the framework of their explorations, their own".¹⁴ Thus, the various rules of procedure, which are employed in the classroom, are to be 'internalized' by the students. In this way a stud-

¹⁴Ibid., p. 12.

ent may be said to "pick up" certain dispositions by incorporating various principles into his conceptual framework. From being treated as an individual, we would hope that he tends to see others in the same light, and so on.

A second group of principles of procedure are those built into the framework of desirable activities such as history and mathematics. Coming to grips with these principles means that the student learns the methods of collecting, criticising and evaluating evidence in these fields. To be trained in science is to acquire the attitudes and appreciations implicit in the principles operative on the inside of this form of thought. To know how to collect evidence in support of a point of view, or to criticize and evaluate it once it has been obtained are, in Peters' view, attitudes toward such forms of thought, developed through participation in them.

Peters' analysis of 'education' has yielded two sets of criteria, by which one can decide, whether certain processes are 'educational' or not, and if a man has become 'educated' or not. The process by which a person gradually becomes 'educated' occur over an extended period of time, and as a result the manifold achievements that characterize an education develop subtly over that period. The upshot of this is,

the forms of knowledge and understanding defining
the outlook of an educated man are inseparable from
the principles of procedure which characterize the
public situations in which they are acquired,

developed and transmitted to others.¹⁵

Thus, the criteria are not standards to be met 'once-and-for-all' but are descriptive of processes and achievements in and through which the outlook of the individual is transformed.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 14.

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